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The aims of this paper are firstly to present a unified descrip-
tion of the Israeli government's export policies and of the growth and
composition of Israel's exports and secondly to provide macroeconomic
analysis of her export performance. The first section outlines the
major policies which the government has adopted to promote exports.
In sections 2 and 3 the trends in the volume and composition of exports
are described and comparisons made with other countries. The constant
market shares model is then used in section 4 to identify the .sources
of Israel's export growth in the 1960s. In the final two sections
exports are divided into two groups, non-manufactured goods (plus
diamonds) and manufactured goods. Greater attention is paid to the
latter category, since this is the area in which Israel's prospects
for future export expansion are brightest and since it is also the
more fruitful category for finding lessons for LDCs seeking to expand
exports. Analysis of the factors behind the expansion of Israel's
manufactured exports is carried out by means of constant market share
analysis and econometric estimation of the aggregate supply function
of manufactured exports.
The major finding concerns the relationship between export policies
and performance. Both the descriptive and the analytical sections
suggest a positive relationship between policy and performance. It
is unclear to what extent world demand was a causal factor in Israel's
export expansion, although it is found that neither the coirinodity nor
the market composition of Israel's exports had a harmful demand-side
effect on her export performance. The lack of an unfavourable
commodity composition of exports is in contrast to most other LDCs.
A further positive stimulus to Israel's exports lay in her domestic
This paper reports research undertaken in the "Sonderforschungs-
bereich Nr. 86, Weltwirtschaft und internationale Wirtschafts--
beziehungen (Kiel/Hamburg)", with financial support provided by
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. I am grateful to Dr. J.R.
Donges for helpful comments on an earlier draft.- 2 -
economic growth, which may have improved her international competitive-
ness by reducing average costs. It is, however, not proven whether
the direction of causality was from increased production to increased
exports or vice versa. Evidence is also found for the existence of a
recession/boom effect, whereby Israeli exports increased by a greater
extent when domestic demand was growing slowly than during domestic
booms. Further explanations of individual export successes are given
in section 6, e.g., as unintended consequences of import substitution
policies or as a result of improved domestic resource allocation.
Two limitations on the scope of the paper should be made clear
from the start. Export expansion is accepted as a valid goal of
economic policy and no attempt is made to evaluate the reasons for
adopting this goal. A complete assessment of a country's export
policies requires knowledge of the consequences of her export perfor-
mance on industrial development, employment, inflation and income
distribution, as well as on her balance of payments position.
Secondly, the question of whether the composition of Israel's exports
was optimal (and whether charges in their composition were in the
right direction) is not tackled. Although references are made in the
paper to Israel's comparative advantage, no estimates were made of
where this lay. These issues will form the subjects of future papers.
1. Government Policies to Encourage Exports
Government policy to encourage exports has been of three types.
During most of Israel's existence direct financial inducements in the
form of premiums, subsidies, etc. have been given to exporters.
Indirect assistance, in the form of organizing and promoting foreign
sales (by making bilateral trade agreements, establishing government
export firms, covering risks, etc.), has also been provided. In
addition to encouraging existing firms to export, the government has- 3 -
taken the initiative in developing industries considered to have export
potential.
Upon attaining independence Israel's currency x^as the old
Palestinian pound which was at par with sterling. This was below the
equilibrium exchange rate and thus provided a disincentive to exporters.
To compensate exporters the government paid premiums based on total
export proceeds. These premiums were the main form of financial induce-
ment to exporters between 1949 and 1951 and were retained until 1955,
although during the 1952-5 gradual devaluation when multiple exchange
rates existed there was no clear distinction between export premiums
and the formal exchange rate on exports. The problem with this
system was that it could lead to a loss of foreign exchange, since
exports could still be profitable for the entrepreneur although the
foreign exchange value added was zero. This led to attempts to limit
vertical differentials (between export proceeds and the price of
imported inputs) between 1952 and 1955 and finally to the abolition of
premiums on total export proceeds in 1955.
After 1952 export premiums were replaced as the main financial
incentive to exporters by various schemes for compensation via domestic
sales, of which the most important was the Pamaz arrangement. Under
this arrangement exporters were allowed to retain their proceeds in
foreign currency bank accounts. The value of the direct import
component of exports was to be used to purchase inputs, while the
foreign currency value added could be used to purchase goods in the
producers' "general line of production" for use as inputs to further
exports or for sale on the domestic market. The "Pamaz arrangement
reduced the red tape associated with applying for an import licence
and fixing the exchange rate for imported inputs, and also eliminated
most of the vertical differentials which had occurred x^ith the earlier
The following description of the policy measures is based en Ilalevi
and Klinov-Malul pp. 239-245 and Michaely (1971) pp. 24-39. The
description in the text merely outlines the salient points, since
further details are readily available from the two quoted sources.- 4 -
structure of export premiums. It could give a great incentive to
export if the producer could then import goods into a domestic market
where demand was strong and he had a monopolistic position. The
disadvantages of the Pamaz arrangement was that it led to horizontal
differentials in that the subsidy differed between industrial branches,
depending on how well protected the domestic market was. After 1956
the significance of the Pamaz arrangement was eroded by (i) limita-
tions on the amounts which could be deposited in Pamaz accounts, (ii)
increased liberalization of raw material imports, undercutting the
monopolistic basis of the system, (iii) the extension of direct
premiums on value added. It was finally abolished in 1959.
The current system of premiums on value added was introduced in
1956. Under this system export proceeds were valued at a mixed rate;
the import component was valued at the formal exchange rate, which
was the cost to the exporter, and the value added was valued at the
formal rate plus a premium. This provided a fairly good substitute
for devaluation between 1955 and 1962 (Halevi and Klinov-Malul,
p. 242). Vertical discrimination was eliminated by this system, but
insofar as different exports or exports to different countries didn't
receive the same subsidy horizontal discrimination was retained.
After the February 1962 devaluation most export subsidies (that to
the textile industry being the most notable exception) were abolished
and reliance placed on the formal exchange rate to provide adequate
financial incentive to export. This reliance proved to be rather
unrealistic in the medium term and in 1965 some subsidies were
reintroduced. Since then the size of the subsidies has steadily
increased.
The extent of the direct financial inducement given to exporters
is given by the effective exchange rate, i.e. the value in Israeli
pounds of a dollar's worth of exports (Table I). Some quantitative
parallels to the above description are clear. The largest percentage
increase in the EER for exports coincides with the introduction and
spread of the Pamaz arrangement 1952-4 and reveals the high rents
available under the quota regime existing at that time. The slowest- 5 -



















































































































:or 1962 because of


























were multiple exchange rates, the
first and that on imports second
February 1962, November 1967
1971; formal rates for these
the rate existing for more than six months.
years reflect
Sources: 1949-62 Michaely (1971), p. 85; 1962-71 Amiel (1972), p. 32.- 6 -
increase is in the 1962-5 period when export subsidies were not
granted. A more useful guide to the financial rewards of exporting
is a comparison between the EER on exports and that on imports, since
the usual alternative market for an exporter was to sell domestically
in competition wil
given in Table I.
2
in competition with imported goods. The ratios of the two EERs are
The average EERs discussed above reveal nothing of the discrimin-
ation between exporters in different branches of the economy. No
definite pattern of discrimination between major branches emerged in
the early and mid 1950s (Michaely (1971), p. 102), although Baruh's
estimates show some preference towards diamonds 1955-8 (Earuh,
pp. 56-7). Since 1958, however, a fairly clear ranking has emerged
with non-citrus agriculture receiving the highest effective exchange
rate, followed by industrial goods other than diamonds, diamonds,
citrus and services (Halevi and Klinov-Malul, pp. 242-3). Such
broad sectoral divisions can conceal intra-sectoral variations, e.g.
the incentives granted to the textile industry (cf. Table II), but
they give some idea of the government's priorities.
A further inducement to exporters, which is not included in the
EERs but which is conceptually close to being a direct monetary
incentive, is the possibility of obtaining cheap financing from the
government's Export Fund. The major reason for treating this
appears to be the lack of accurate data, but by making certain assump-
tions Amiel is able to obtain EERs which include allowance for the
interest differentials on cheap credit (Amiel (1972), p. 41).
2
It should be noted that the exporter's EER is the I£ return for a
dollar of value added in exports, whereas the EER on imports is the
I£ cost of a dollar's worth of imports. Thus a ratio of unity does
not imply neutrality between promotion of import substitution and
of exports. The ideal yardstick for comparison would be Michaely's
"protection rate", i.e. the I£ return for a dollar of value saved
in domestic production competing with imports. (Michaely (1971),
p. 115). Because of data inavailability, estimates of the protec-
tion rate are only available for 1958, when it stood at 2.63 (cf.
EER on imports of 2.35).- 7 -


































































Source; Amiel (1972), p. 49.
Between 1962 and 1965 export subsidization in the form of interest
differentials was greater than that of other direct supports. Since
most of this subsidization went to the diamond industry , a ranking
of revised EERs would place diamonds higher than their ranking in the
previous paragraph (or in Table II). Even in the 1966-9 period,
after the revival of export premiums, interest differentials amounted
to 15-20 % of total budgetary supports for industrial exports other
than diamonds, and the total subsidy on diamond exports (Amiel (1972),
p. 42).
Provision of greater financial inducements to export has long
been recognized as only one part of the government's export promotion
programme. There is a general tendency among entrepreneurs to look
first to the domestic market and only later, if at all, to foreign
markets. This is not so much a matter of lower rewards, but of lack
of information; and obtaining information does of course have a cost.
Such a problem is magnified in Israel's case since all of her export
markets are located at some distance. A corollary to the lack of
2
The major reason for this is that, while the usual practice in
the world market is for suppliers to permit the purchase of inputs
on credit, the principal supplier to the world rough diamond
market (the London Syndicate) does not sell on credit.- 8 -
information by Israeli producers is the lack of information regarding
the quality and range of Israeli exports available to overseas
retailers and consumers.
In the 1950s a series of institutions were set up by various
government ministries, the Manufacturers' Association, etc. to
overcome the non-price obstacles to exporting. These institutions
were primarily aimed at providing information about foreign market
conditions and standards requirements. The government also established
the Foreign Trade Risks Insurance Company (IFTRIC), the Israel Company
for Fairs and Exhibitions (ICOPEX), and the Institute for Industrial
Design and Packaging. Seminars on export problems and training
programmes for managers were organized. These measures were no doubt
beneficial to exporters, but it is difficult to quantify their
significance. The overall impression, however, is that the Israeli
government did not devote great attention to export promotion during
the 1950s, which is consistent with the view that the government was
concentrating its efforts on promoting import substitution at this
time. The government also took the initiative in concluding bilateral
trade agreements with other soft-currency countries (e.g. Yugoslavia,
Turkey), although exports under these agreements were only a small
proportion of total exports.
Government expenditure on the subsidization of commodity exports
in the 1960s is given in Table III. Between 1962 and 1965 consider-
able neglect of indirect export promotion, primarily because of
reduced expenditure on advertising and market research, is revealed.
Expenditure on indirect subsidies even declined relative to that on
direct subsidies, which was itself fairly stagnant in this period
(see above). The trend was reversed in 1965 and after that the
indirect export subsidies increased rapidly. This increase appears
to have continued into the 1970s.
Combining the above descriptions of direct and indirect
assistance to exports reveals definite shifts in the government's
emphasis on export promotion. In the early 1950s exporters were
granted financial incentives to recompense them for the low exchange- 9 -
Table III: INDIRECT SUBSIDIZATION OF COMMODITY EXPORTS 1962-9 (I£ million)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Participation in export
costs 2.9 2.9 3.3 1.1 8.3 12.0 16.7 22.7
- transport costs 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 4.6 4.1 5.0 5.5
- production costs 2.7 2.8 2.8 0.9 3.7 7.9 11.7 17.2
Export promotion 0.3 - 7.3 8.6 19.3
Advertising and market





































Source: Amiel (1972), p. 51.
rate. Between 1953 and 1955 the EER on exports fell relative to that
on imports, but it then rose again until 1958 (Table I). Since the
protection rate (cf. footnote 3) would have been higher than the
EER on imports, it can safely be said that government policy favoured
import substitution vis-a-vis export promotion throughout the 1950s.
This bias was also reflected in the scale of government resources
devoted to non-financial inducements to exporters. In the early
1960s government policy moved away from import substitution and quota
restrictions towards reliance on the price mechanism. The devaluation
of February 1962 was intended to remove the price disincentive to
exporters which a low exchange rate had formed. It was hoped that
this would be sufficient to increase exports rapidly, but when this
hope proved unfounded (cf. next section) the government resorted
again (1966) to export premiums and to increased expenditure on
indirect inducements to exporters.
The direct and indirect subsidies were aimed at encouraging
existing firms to export a greater proportion of their output or at- 10 -
encouraging new firms to consider foreign as well as domestic markets.
The situation in Israel, whereby a considerable proportion of the
available capital is allocated by the government, also permits the
government to try to increase exports by discriminating in its
allocation of investment funds in favour of branches of the economy
which tend to have large export/output ratios. In the 1950s export
potential was one of the criteria governing the allocation of invest-
ment funds, but it tended to be ignored and emphasis was placed on
import substituting potential. The emphasis was reversed in the
1960s, as can be seen from Table IV. In this table industries are
ranked by their export/sales ratios and an arbitrary dividing line is
drawn between the low and high export-ratio industries. The share in
investment in manufacturing of the ten low export industries is seen
to have fallen rapidly between 1958-9 and 1962-3, risen again
between 1962-3 and 1966-7 and then fallen again, in that the 1968-9
share was 49 % compared to 61.8 % in 1958-9. This pattern fits in
with the above description of government export policy as revealed
in subsidies. After a lack of emphasis on export promotion during
most of the 1950s, it became a major policy goal around the turn of
the decade. After the 1962 devaluation there x^as a slackening of
government activity in this field, since it was thought that the
devaluation itself was sufficient to encourage exports, but then
active promotion of exports was resumed in the later 1960s.
In this section government policies to encourage exports have
been grouped into three categories: direct financial inducements,
indirect aid to exporters and the use of development funds to
establish new enterprises in industries with export potential.
Although the above tools have been the major weapons of export
4
It is, of course, possible that investment in an industry may be
justified both because it can efficiently produce previously
imported goods and because it can sell its products abroad. The
textile industry, for example, was expected to be able to
achieve both of these goals, and in consequence received sub-
stantial allocations from the Development Budget.- 11 -
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Source: Michaely (1973), ch. 6, Table 9.- 12 -
promotion policy, the list is not exhaustive. Especially in a small
country where personal contacts are important, a policy goal of export
expansion can be pushed in many ways. For example, industrial organiz-
ation policy has been used to encourage exports in two ways. Firstly,
permission to form a cartel has been linked with promises from the
firms concerned to raise their exports. Secondly, although there is
no institutionalized encouragement of industrial concentration, the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry has at times encouraged mergers as
a means of increasing efficiency and export competitiveness. This has
led to a conflict between encouraging efficiency and discouraging
monopoly power, but since 1969 (when the Encouragement to Industry
Act removed some of the obstacles to mergers) the balance has been
tipped in favour of encouraging industrial concentration and leaving
the task of providing competition to liberalized imports. A further
dimension to government trade policy is the negotiations with the EEC
which have been taking place since 1962. The first agreement xoas
signed in June 1970 and a fuller agreement is to be signed in January
1975. Although these agreements have had little effect on Israel's
exports in the past, relations with the EEC will be an important
factor in the future.
2. Aggregate Export Performance
The time path of Israel's balance of trade can be seen from Table
V. Net exports (i.e. gross exports minus returned exports) have
consistently failed to match net imports, leading to the substantial
trade deficit in every year of her exintence. The do.ficii: quadrupled
between 1949 and 1972, but did not rise greatly on a per capita basis
and was falling as a percentage of GNP (but with large fluctuations
around the trend). A more economically meaningful picture of Israel's
export performance (for most purposes) is given by the series in
This has often been put in the form of having the cartel members
pay a levy on horns sales, which is to be used for export preiriia.
Although this system is neither equitable nor efficient, it has
the advantage from the government's viewpoint of requiring no


























































































































































































Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel 1973. pp. 196-7.- 14 -
Table VI which improves on column 1 of Table V in three ways: (a)
services are included, (b) constant prices are used, and (c) the
direct import component is subtracted from net exports to give a more
accurate measure of the net contribution to foreign exchange earnings.
The principal feature of all three export series (total, per
capita and value added at constant prices) is the rapid growth rate.
This expansion has not been even and can be divided into several sub-
periods. The early years of Israel's existence, especially 1952-4,
saw rapid growth from a low base, followed by a period of relatively
slow growth between 1954 and 1958. During the years 1958-63 an
export boom occurred as merchandise exports per capita more than
doubled and the value added almost tripled. The year 1964 signalled
the end of the boom, but in the next year export growth picked up
again and has proceeded fairly steadily since.
The best available indicator of the share of Israel's productive
resources devoted to exports is the ratio of value added in exports
to total value added (i.e. GNP). In 1949 the ratio was negligible
and in the early and mid 1950s it fluctuated around 5 %. Thereafter
it has followed a constantly rising trend reaching 10 % in the early
1960s and 15 % in the early 1970s.
7
It is interesting to compare Israel's exports/GNP ratios with
those of other countries. Unfortunately this cannot be done on a
value added basis for lack of data, but a comparison of total export/
GNP ratios for 1954 and 1968 is given in Table VII. Of all the
countries listed, only Spain and the USA devoted a smaller proportion
of their resources to exports than Israel did in 1954. This finding
A still better measure would be given by subtracting direct and
indirect import requirements (cf. Tables XXIII and XXIV below),
but this is only possible for years for which input-output tables
exist.
All figures in this paragraph are from Michaely (1973), ch.1.4.
Ratios are in constant (1955) prices.- 15 -



























































Source: Michaely (1973), ch. 6, Table 8.- 16 -















































































Source: Araiel (1973), pp. 61-2.- 17 -
is all the more significant in view of the fact that Israel is the
smallest country (in terms of population) in the sample, which one
Q
might expect to be a force in favour of increased outward orientation.
By 1968 Israel's export/GNP ratio had reached 10.6 %, but was still
small in comparison with the developed European countries. The
comparison is especially striking vis-a-vis smaller countries like
Belgium (39.4 %) and Denmark (21.3 %) , or even the poorer small
countries like Ireland (26.7 %) and Austria (17.5 %).. The Israeli
economy had become more externally oriented than several of the semi-
developed countries of southern Europe, e.g. Spain (6.3 %), Turkey
(4.6 %) and Greece (6.2 %) - but not Yugoslavia (15.8 %). The
tendency apparent in these data is for countries to become more
externally oriented in their economic affairs as their GNP increases.
Israel has followed this path to some extent, but the smaller
European countries' experience indicates that much scope remains for
increasing the share of Israel's productive resources engaged in the
production of exports.
A more dynamic evaluation of Israel's export performance is
given by comparing her export growth rate with that of other countries.
Between 1950 and 1970 Israel's exports, measured in current dollar
prices, increased by an annual average of 16.4 %. The average rate
for LDCs was 4.7 % (for non-oil exporting LDCs 3.9 %) and for
developed market economies 8.0 %. Apart from the oil countries Libya
(38.5 %) and Iran (17.0 %) and a few miniscule island economies
(Bahamas, Bermuda, Virgin Islands and the Ryu Kyu Islands), only
South Korea's export growth rate of 21.2 % exceeded Israel's. The
other export-oriented Asian economies had lower growth rates, e.g.
Taiwan (14.1 %) and Hong Kong (7.7 %), and Japan's export growth
rate (15.7 %) was marginally less than Israel's. The highest export
growth rates in Europe - Italy (13.0 %), Yugoslavia (12.9 %),
9
Bulgaria (15.1 %) - were significantly below Israel's. In sum,
Q
Cross-section econometric studies have revealed statistically
significant negative correlation between export/GNP ratios and
population (cf. Learner and Stern, pp. 153-6, for a survey of the
literature).
9 ...
All figures in this paragraph from United Nations: Handbook of
International Trade and Development Statistics 1972, pp. 22-5, 30.- 18 -
for a country with few natural resources, Israel's export growth rate
was spectacular.
Ah evaluation of Israel's aggregate export performance is mixed.
On the one' hand she has done exceptionally well, but not well enough
to remove her endemic trade deficit. On the other hand, she could do
better in view of her rapid increase in GNP, if the experience of the
smaller European countries is a relevant guide. Thus, analysis of the
causes of Israel's export growth could have the tx^ofold purpose of
indicating whether there are any lessons for other LDCs wishing to
increase their export growth rate and of identifying ways in which
Israel could increase her export earnings still further. Before
turning to such an analysis we will examine the composition of Israel's
exports.
3. The Composition of Israel's Exports
The export structure inherited by Israel upon becoming independent
was a typical example of monoculture. In 1949 citrus fruits and juices
accounted for 67 % of Israel's exports. A second important export
sector was created by the inflow of skilled craftsmen who established
a diamond polishing industry and in 1949 this accounted for 19 % of
exports. The next most important export earner was artificial teeth
with some 2 %.
Since 1949 citrus and diamonds have remained the major export
earners, but their relative importance has declined as exports of
other industrial goods (especially textiles, clothing, chemicals and
machinery) has increased. The trend through to 1970 can be seen
clearly in Table VIII, although a slight reversal of the trend
occurred after 1970 as world diamond prices increased. If value
added figures for exports were to be used, the trend towards "other
industrial" exports would remain but the importance of citrus would
be increased and that of diamonds reduced. Foreign exchange value



















Table VIII: COMPOSITION OF ISRAEL'S COMMODITY EXPORTS, 1949-72




Note: 1949 figures do not add to 100 because of a category "Various
Articles"
Other figures may not add up to 100 because of rounding
Sources: Halevi & Klinov-Malul, p. 150; Statistical Abstract of Israel
1950/1, p. 80; Ibid., 1973, p. 208.
around 50 % in "other industrial" exports. The share of citrus in
value added of commodity exports is currently about 20 % compared to
10 % for diamonds (Michaely (1973), ch. 1.4.). A further trend has
been the rapid increase in the exports of two services, tourism and
transportation services, from negligible values in 1950 to around
50 % of the value of total merchandise exports in 1970. Value added
in tourism is high (estimated at 75 %) and low in shipping (estimated
at 15-18 %).
M
The data in Table VIII clearly indicate a shift in emphasis in
Israel's commodity exports away from the two traditional goods and
towards assorted manufactured goods. This result is, however, only
'\f ...




Value added in exports is defined here as —- where
X.
X. = foreign exchange earned by the sale of the i good,
M. = foreign exchange spent on producing the exports of the
i good. Data are from Halevi and Klinov-Malul, p. 149.
Halevi and Klinov-Malul, p. 151.- 20 -
criterion of the share in exports of the two main commodities was used.
A more common criterion, but equally arbitrary, is to look at the
proportion of exports taken up by the ten main export groups. Amiel
has done this for the period 1954-69 at the three digit SITC level, and
his results are presented in Table IX. The interesting conclusion is
that on this criterion the increased diversification of Israel's exports
since 1954 has been very small; the ten main export groups account for
75 % in 1969 compared to 78 % in 1954.
An alternative concept of export diversification is to examine the
number of commodities exported. Whereas in 1954 Israel exported
commodities in 123 of the 177 SITC three digit groups, her exports carae
from 145 groups in 1969 (Table X). Thus a distinct trend towards
finding new export goods is revealed. The fluctuations around the
trend are, however, of greater interest, for the major periods of
increase were 1958-61 and 1964-7 which were years of relatively slow
domestic growth. This finding supports the hypothesis that entre-
preneurs who do not normally export are more willing to seek out export
possibilities in a recession. It also suggests, as an extension to
this hypothesis, that such entrepreneurs are not too concerned about
maintaining their export sales once the domestic market revives. This
hypothesis will be tested in section 6 (d), but for the moment we will
return to the question of commodity concentration.
None of the criteria used so far to measure concentration are
completely satisfactory. The share of the x largest groups onl37 con-
cerns one tail of the distribution and ignores changes within that
part of the distribution, while the number of commodity groups
exported says nothing at all about the shape of the distribution.
The problem of finding a measure which is sensitive both to the shape
of the whole distribution and to the number of units has been beet
overcome by the Hirschman index (Hirschman, pp. 157-60):





1, . .., n- 21 -





























































































































































































The figures in parentheses are the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) code
numbers (adapted to Israeli requirements): 025 - eggs; 51 - citrus; 053 - canned and processed
fruit; 561 - manufactured fertilizers; 599 - refined petroleum products; 629 - rubber products;
631 - plywood; 651 - yarn and woven textiles; 661 - cement; 667 - diamonds; 698 - metal
products; 735 - ships and boats; 841 - apparel.
Source: Amiel (1973), p. 64.- 22 -
Table X; THE HIRSCHMAN CONCENTRATION INDEX OF ISRAEL'S COMMODITY EXPORTS





























































where n = the number of export groups, x. = the value of exports
• th
 n
of the i group, X = E x.. Maximum possible concentration,
i=l
 X
H = 100, occurs when a single commodity is exported and minimum
possible concentration, H = 100/V"n~ , occurs xvhen exports are
divided equally between the n export groups. Amiel's estimates of H
for Israel 1954-69 are given in Table X. According to the Hirschman
criterion Israel's commodity exports did become less concentrated
between 1954 and 1969. This was not, however, a continuous develop-
ment. Substantial diversification only occurred in the years 1956-61.
Between 1961- and 1964 there was a reverse movement towards increased
concentration and since 1964 there has been little change in the
degree of concentration.
Israel's concentration index (H) was higher in 1968 than that
of all developed countries apart from Australia, New Zealand and- 23 -
Iceland. It was lower than that of most LDCs, although there were some
surprising exceptions (e.g. India, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Paraguay,
Morocco, Peru, which all had considerably lower per capita GNPs than
Israel). The small export-oriented Asian countries all had more
diversified exports than Israel, i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan
12 and South Korea. This suggests that although Israel is now far
from a monocultural economy it would be possible for her to go still
further in diversifying her exports.
A further aspect of export concentration is the variety of
destinations to which the exports go. Since Israel's immediate
neighbours, and natural trading partners, have no commercial links
with her she has been forced to seek out more distant markets (Table
XI). Initially these were dominated by the U.K. and the USA, which
took almost 70 % of Israel's exports in 1949. The importance of the
U.K. as a market has declined considerably since 1949, but western
Europe and the USA have remained the principal destinations for
Israel's exports, e.g. in 1972 almost 20 % went to the USA and 40 %
to the U.K. and EEC. There is some connection between commodity and
market concentration because certain markets are associated with
specific goods (e.g. citrus and W. Europe, diamonds and Hong Kong).
In section 1 Israeli government policies to encourage exports
were described and the question of the degree of success of these
policies was left unanswered. The analyses of commodity and market
concentration of Israel's exports in the present section provide alter-
native hypotheses to explain Israel's export performance. The growth
of Israel's exports may have been hampered by her concentration on a
small number of goods and markets and her failure to expand
sufficiently into new goods and markets. Alternatively, Israel's
exports may have been aided by this concentration, if it was located
in rapidly growing areas of world trade. An attempt to evaluate
12
U.N. Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1972,
pp. 211-3. The only LDCs not mentioned in the text with Hirschman
index values lower than Israel were Mexico, Argentina and Malta.- 24 -



























































































Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel 1949/50, op. 78-9;
Ibid. 1959/60, p. 286; Ibid.. 1973, p. -
;-10.these alternative hypotheses will be made in the next section.
4. Constant Market Shares Analysis of Total Commodity Exports
Israel's export growth rate has been considerably larger than
that of most LDCs and is thus a phenomenon requiring explanation. At
first sight it appears that exports have been responsive to government
policy. The slowdown in export growth in the mid 1950s occurred when
government emphasis was on import substitution and the export boom
which started in 1953 was reasonably well correlated with movements
in effective exchange rates (which suggests that Israeli exporters are
in aggregate price responsive). It is more difficult to identify such
a correlation in the 1960s, although Michaely has proposed a strong
relationship between government investment policy and export growth
(Michaely (1973), ch. 6; cf. Table IV above). The argument in favour
of a positive relationship between export growth and government policy
is convincing, but also begs the question of the quantitative
significance of the relationship. There were clearly other factors at
work. The rapid growth in world trade since 1950 would explain some
of Israel's export growth, although this could not explain why her
export growth was faster than that of other countries. Given the
concentration of Israeli exports, the rate of growth of the citrus and
diamond markets and of the American and West European markets would be
1 3
especially significant for the growth of her exports. It is also
possible that Israeli producers were becoming more efficient for
reasons unrelated to government trade policy, and ware thus better able
to compete abroad.
It should perhaps be emphasised that concentration of exports in a
small number of commodities is not per se harmful to the growth of
export earnings. Commodity concentration has in the past had a
"bad press", because it has in fact led to many disasters, especia
in the interwar years, and it does represent an increased risk e.s
reliance is placed on one or two commodity markets. It can, however,
lead to spectacular gains as the oil producers found in 1973.
Finally, it should be noted that this does not deny that commodity
concentration may have deleterious non-trade effects on tho social
or economic structure which reduce its desirability, but such
effects are not relevant to the current argument. Similarly, con-
centration in a small number of markets is not necessarily harmful
to export growth, although it has been shown that market conccr-cra-
tion is negatively correlated with sales stability (Hirsch S Earuch).- 26 -
The method used here to estimate the relative quantitative
importance of the various factors working on Israel's export growth is
14 constant market shares analysis (CMS). The increase in Israel's
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where the subscripts refer to the i commodity group and j destin-
ation for Israeli exports. The r variables represent growth rates for
world trade and thus the first expression on the right hand side
indicates what Israel's exports would have been in 1969 had they
expanded at the same rate as total world trade. The final term on the
RHS also has a clear interpretation in that it represents the
difference between the actual increase in Israeli exports and what the
increase would have been if Israel had maintained a constant share in
the market for each commodity at each destination. The other two terms
separate out the commodity and market distribution effects. The second
term indicates the effect on Israel's exports of differences between
the growth rates of world trade in her commodities and of total world
trade. The third term shows the corresponding effect with regard to
export destination, the commodity composition effect having been taken
into account. An alternative formulation of equation (2) would take
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Identity (2) has been the form used in most previous studies but, since
the two forms yield different estimates and there is no logical reason
14
The first use of CMS was by Tyszynski. For a clear presentation of
the mechanics of calculation see Learner and Stern, ch. 7.- 27 -
for preferring either one, we will provide estimates using both
formulations.
The limitations of the CMS method are well-known. The model is
based on an identity and can thus provide no causal explanation. It has
no stochastic basis and is useless for projection purposes, i.e. it
provides only an ex post evaluation of past performance. The model is
sensitive to the choice of time period and the level of aggregation of
commodities and markets, but provides no guideline as to the appropriate
time period or aggregation levels. Since base period weights are used,
there is an index number problem. Finally, the CMS model implies a
normative judgement that retaining a constant share of world markets
is the relevant yardstick for judging a country's export performance.
In spite of these limitations the CMS model may point to the areas in
which an explanation of export performance can be found and is there-
fore useful provided that the precise values of the estimates obtained
from it are not overemphasised.
The CMS estimates of the sources of changes in Israel's exports in
the 1960s are given in Table XII. The commodity and market concentra-
tion of Israel's exports appears to have had little effect on their
growth rate. The concentration of commodities and perhaps of
destination was in areas of slower than average growth, but the total
negative effect of the commodity and market structure of Israeli
exports was only equal to 3-4 % of the actual growth of exports. The
positive sources of Israel's export growth were the increase in total
world trade and improved performance within commodity and regional
markets. The last term is usually referred to as increased "competitive-
ness", although in economic terms it is a residual, cover-all term.
The size of the "competitiveness" effect suggests that Israeli exports
became more efficient or enjoyed an improvement in their terms of
trade, both of which could have been in consequence of government
policy (either of Israeli or of other governments). The conclusion
regarding the positive influence of Israeli government policy is
limited by the fact that other forces work on the "competitiveness"
effect, e.g. domestic demand in Israel may independently affect the
volume of exports without any increase in efficiency or any- 28 -
Table XII: SOURCES OF CHANGES IN ISRAEL'S EXPORTS 1960-9
Israeli exports in 1969
Israeli exports in 1960
Increase in Israeli
exports due to:-






































Note: (a) i=l, ..., 6 the groups being SITC 3, (0+1+2+4), 5, (6+8), 7,
9.
(b) j=l, ..., 7 the markets being North America, EEC, EFTA,
Comecon, Other Europe, Asia and Africa and the Rest of the World.
Sources: U.N. Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics
1972; U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics, 1961, 1969.
government policy influence. The final evaluation of the effect of
Israeli government policy must be agnostic; the CMS analysis suggests
that it was positive and may have been significant, but further
analysis is required to break down the "competitiveness" effect.
Comparison of the CMS estimates for Israel with those for other
countries yields the expected conclusions. Banerji's estimates for all
LDCs for 1955-62 and 1962-70 reveal that their exports grew more
slowly than world trade and that the major negative effect was the
commodity composition of their exports. The "competitiveness" effect
was negative, but was very small in the 1960s (Banerji (1974), p. 459).
This suggests that Israel was relatively favoured among LDCs by the
commodity composition of her exports, but that she also made far more- 29 -
substantial within market gains than the LDCs as a whole did.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the CMS analysis. First,
the concentration of Israel's exports by commodities and by markets had
little effect on her aggregate export growth rate. In this she was
fortunate in comparison with other LDCs, which in general had to contend
with a large negative commodity effect. Second, since the "competitive-
ness" effect is the source of a significant part of Israel's export
growth, the hypothesis that government policy played a major roia in
fostering this expansion is not refuted. In weighing these con-
clusions the limitations of the CMS method (see above) must be borne in
mind. From an economic point of view the choice of time period was
arbitrary and the results may be biased by the choice of end years.
Furthermore, the choice of commodity groups was based on data avail-
ability rather than relevance to the Israeli case. If the latter
criterion were to be used, it would clearly point to the separate
identification of SITC groups 051 (citrus) and 667 (diamonds).
The question must now be posed as to what is the optimal direction
for proceeding with research into Israel's export performance and
prospects. Clearly there is some advantage to carrying out CMS analyses
for different time periods and different market groupings in order to
test the sensitivity of the present estimates to the dates and regions
used. It appears, however, that the major weakness of the above CMS
estimates lies in the commodity groupings which are used. Israel's
exports are not highly concentrated according to SITC one digit
categories, but are concentrated within these categories. Thus if
world trade in SITC categories 0+1+2+4 increased rapidly this v?ould
be of little help to Israel unless category 05 (citrus) grew; since the
latter only forms a small proportion of the former it is quite possible
that their growth rates might differ widely. To establish the true
nature of the commodity effect on Israel a minimum requirement would
be to examine citrus and diamonds as separate categories. In the
absence of such a disaggregation of commodity groups, rapidly
diminishing returns would be encountered in carrying out further CMS
analyses for Israel.- 30 -
The procedure to be followed in the next section will be to under-
take separate case studies of citrus and diamond exports. These differ
from most of Israel's other export goods in that, since Israel has a
significant share of their world markets, demand conditions loom much
larger in considering citrus and diamond exports than the^r do in con-
sidering other exports. Tourism will also be given separate treatment
since it is, for religious reasons, a differentiated product and thus
Israel is in a monopoly or monopolistic competition situation. Soma
other agricultural and mineral products provide export earnings but
these will always be marginal in view of Israel's restricted endoviment
of natural resources, including arable land and supply is inelastic
in the long-run. Thus most of Israel's future export earnings not
provided by citrus, diamonds and tourism will have to come from indus-
trial exports other than diamonds. This last category will be the
focus of section 6. It is within this context that further CMS
estimates will be made, i.e. applied only to SITC categories 5, 6
(minus 667), 7 and 8.
5* Israel's Traditional Exports and Other Non-Manufactured Exports
In this section Israel's past performance and future prospects for
exporting diamonds, citrus fruit, tourism and other non-manufactured
goods and services are analyzed. The diamond polishing industry is
also studied for possible lessons regarding export promotion policy
towards industry. It should be emphasised that our aim is not to
provide forecasts of future Israeli exports, but rather to indicate
the central role which our main object of later study (manufactured
exports other than diamonds) will have to play in Israel's export
expansion programme for lack of alternatives.
(a) Diamonds
The diamond-cutting industry possesses several unique features
which have made the traditional determinants of industrial location
(i.e. location of raw materials, power and fuel availability, capital- 31 -
availability, market access, etc.) inapplicable to it (Berman, p. 316).
Thus, although diamond mining is heavily concentrated in Africa ami the
USSR, the major trading centre is London and the major processing
centres are Belgium and Israel. The explanation of the location
patterns is largely in terms of non-economic forces. The development
of the diamond trade in the Low Countries was a consequence of the
religious toleration granted to the Jews from the fifteenth century on,
which permitted them to settle there although they were not allowed to
join guilds and their choice of occupation was limited to a few
activities (of which the diamond trade was one).
In more recent times a further factor affecting the location of
the diamond industry is the control of the raw material market by the
'Syndicate'. In the early twentieth century the De Beers group,
operating from South Africa, had a virtual monopoly of the sale of
diamonds on the world market. After 1918, however, a series of new
strikes in South West Africa, Angola, the Belgian Congo and Sierra
Leone led to competitive selling and low prices in an excess supply
situation which culminated in a large price drop in 1929. In the wake
of the depression the chairman of De Beers convinced the African
producers and the world's traders and cutters to agree to a controlled
market in order to stabilize prices. The Central Selling Organization
(known as the Syndicate) then controlled the buying and selling cf
some 80 % of all rough diamonds until the 1950s , when the South
African based Syndicate clashed ideologically with the increasingly
important central African producers and when an excess demand
situation removed the need for artificial price supports. Despite the
reduction in the Syndicate's monopoly position, it still retains a
dominant role since pricing policies in the market remain under a price
leadership pattern (Szenberg, pp. 19-20).
The stimulus for the start of the modern diamond industry in
Israel was the German occupation of the Low Countries in 1940. In
There are no aggregate data on world diamond trade and, because of
the unknown degree of diamond smuggling, all estimates are no more
than rough approximations.- 32 -
view of high output per man and low amount of fixed equipment, personal
contact by the mayor of Netanya with a small number of Jewish diamond-
cutters in Belgium was sufficient impetus to start five small factories
by the end of 1940. This example, deteriorating conditions for Jews in
the Low Countries and expanding US demand led to the rapid increase of
Palestine's diamond industry during World War II (Table XIII). After
the war, however, a group of skilled workers returned to Belgium and
the industry was disrupted by political events in Palestine. In 1947
the Syndicate discontinued all diamond allotments to Palestine in order
to meet Belgium demand and in 1948, after 1200 of the industry's
labour force had been called up for military service, employment in the
industry fell to 800 workers.













































of Israel, Ministry of Commerce and
Industrial Future 1960-5 (Jerusalem,
1960), p. 229.
There was no problem in obtaining uncut diamonds from the Syndicate,
which was willing to supply the Palestinian industry from its
accumulated stocks on hand.- 33 -
In the years following Israeli independence the new government
attempted to reestablish the diamond industry in spite of heavy
Belgian competition. A crucial step in this direction was the
securing from the Syndicate of a quota of raw diamonds sufficient to
provide employment for some 1500 workers. The quota constituted about
70 % of Israel's raw diamond imports, and the industry sustained
2,300 workers in 1955. At the end of 1955 the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry took the initiative in promoting the industry's growth,
and the promotion effort was strengthened in 1958 with the establish-
ment of the Diamond Import Corporation. The aims of government policy
were to establish new factories in development areas as a part of
regional policy and to discover sources of raw diamonds other than the
Syndicate. The first goal was not very successfully met because of
the existence of externalities from proximity of trading and cutting
establishments, and today some 70 % of diamond workers are concentrated
in the cities of Tel Aviv-Yafo, Ramat Can and Netanya. Greater success
was achieved towards the second goal as, after some trial and error,
new sources of supply were found in central Africa and Latin America.
These new supplies provided the basis for rapid expansion after 1958
(Tables XIV and XV) and in 1961 the Syndicate recognized the
importance of Israel as a producer by increasing its allotment. The
Israeli producers soon established a monopoly in their own
speciality, i.e. cutting melees (medium-sized stones), and in 1964
Israel bought 83 % of all melees sold by the Syndicate. Since then
the Israeli industry has grown with increased world demand, and has
even increased its share of the market by vigorous marketing
practices, especially with regard to the rapidly growing east Asian
market. In the early 1970s it appears that Israel has overtaken
Belgium as the world's leading producer, although it is not yet as
important as a trading centre.
If the traditional determinants of industrial location are
inapplicable to the diamond industry (see above), how is the
establishment of a diamond industry in Israel and its subsequent
expansion to become the world's leading producer to be explained?
The initial inflow of Belgian craftsmen was a consequence of thehistorical importance of Jews in the European diamond industry. The
maintenance of a diamond industry in the difficult years following
Israeli independence and the rapid expansion after 1958 are directly
attributable to government actions. Government assistance to the
industry has consisted of some financial inducements (in the 1950s) and
provision of low interest credit (which is important because all
purchases of raw diamonds are on an immediate payment basis), but most
significantly the government has provided a unified front where size is
important , i.e. in securing supplies of raw diamonds and markets for
the finished product. The government also provided help in financing
training and established R & D facilities (Szenberg ch. 6, especially
pp. 160-170 on government help in manpower recruitment).












Source: Levhari and Sheshinski, p. 240.
The contribution of the diamond industry to Israel's export growth,
especially since 1958, indicates a successful case of export promotion.
There do not appear to be significant economies of scale in production
(Levhari and Sheshinski), which would explain the continued existence
of many small establishments in the industry. This view is also to
be found in many publications of the Diamond Institute. Szenberg holds
the opposing view that the minimum optimal scale is 50 workers and that
constant returns only hold above this size (Szenberg, ch. 4).- 35 -
































































































































Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel 1965, p. 261; Ibid. 1S70, p. 221; Ibid, 1973, p. 209.- 36 -
This success follows from the correspondence of the attributes of
diamond production with Israel's endowments. The high value-weight
ratio of both the raw materials and the finished product is ideal for
a country with few raw materials, a small domestic market and no trade
with her neighbours. The low capital and energy requirements also
correspond to Israel's scarce resources, and the foreign exchange
requirements are short term since no expensive machinery and equipment
must be imported. The insufficient quantity of skilled labour was
overcome by devising a system of specialization whereby six individuals
are required to complete the work on one stone, but each requires only
a six month apprenticeship. The entrepreneurial expertise required to
organize this division of labour and to fulfil the general management
function was available in Israel. Thus once the functions of raw
diamond supplier and marketing were taken over by the government the
industry grew rapidly.
The Israeli industry should continue to grow in the future with
world demand. Israel's dominant position does, however, limit the
possibilities for very rapid expansion unless she can move into new
lines or develop new markets. An attempt is being made to increase her
product range by retaining more of the polished diamonds for the
domestic jewellery industry and by turning to smaller stones, although
this will encounter strong competition from India and Belgium which are
the leading producers of this size of stone. The government is
energetically courting prospective purchasers in the rapidly expanding
eastern markets, especially Japan whose diamond imports from Israel are
now second only to the USA. Some uncertainty is presented by the
possibility of the development of automated cutting techniques and of
improved synthetic diamonds; it is unclear how either of these
developments will affect Israel's diamond industry. The biggest
danger for the Israeli industry is probably that of new producers
emerging. The success of Israel itself provides a stimulus to other
countries to move into diamond production or (especially in the cases
of India and the USSR) to expand production. Barriers to entry are
low, especially if the power of the Syndicate diminishes further, and- 37 -
the only real barrier is the significance of workers' experience for
efficiency.
In sum, the diamond industry has remained one of Israel's major
export industries, even when it might have collapsed in the late 1940s
and early 1950s, and should continue to be important in the future.
This is largely a consequence of successful government policy in
promoting an industry eminently suited to Israel's comparative
advantage. The industry cannot, however, be expected to enjoy a
greatly increased growth rate in the future, because Israel's exports
are now a dominant factor in world diamond trade.
(b) Citrus Fruit
Citrus has assumed a major role in Israel's exports because part
of the country is endowed with ideal conditions for producing high
quality fruit. The "citrus belt" is centred on Tel-Aviv and consists
of the area less than 25 kms. from the coast lying between Binyamini in
the north and Gedera in the south. The climatic conditions and relative
ease of irrigating with low chlorine water permit all varieties of
citrus to be grown in this area, in particular shamouti oranges. The
extent of these optimum growing conditions is estimated at some 300 -
350,000 dunams (1 dunam = 1000 sq. metres) and this area under
cultivation was reached in the early 1960s. There is in addition to
the "citrus belt" an unknown quantity of more or less marginal land
capable of adaption to citrus production, and expansion in the last
decade has been in these areas, especially to the south. Climatic
conditions in the southern area are, however, less favourable and can
lead to partial crop failure caused by low temperatures and by more
intensive dry winds. Furthermore soil and irrigation conditions are
inferior, because the soils are often impermeable (thus requiring more
18
Levhari and Sheshinski found average experience of workers to be
easily the most important explanatory variable with respect to
differences in efficiency in the Israel diamond industry. Israel
may have some comparative advantage over other LDCs in that her
higher level of general education may speed up the learning process
within industry.- 38 -
irrigation) and irrigation water is high in chlorine content. Thus as
citrus production moves to the marginal lands unit costs increase
rapidly. The supply curve can be pictured as being fairly elastic
while expansion within the citrus belt region was possible but
becoming more inelastic as production moves beyond the citrus belt,
i.e. within the relevant range for future expansion. Possibilities
of shifting the whole supply curve in a south easterly direction by
technical change appear to be limited since Israeli citrus producers
are already more efficient than other Mediterranean producers and
experiments with increased use of fertilizers, etc., appear negative.
In view of her increasing unit costs, Israel's citrus exports can be
expected to expand rapidly only if world market conditions are
favourable.
Although citrus production is spread through the world, three
quarters of world trade is between Western Europe and its six main
suppliers (Algeria, Israel, Italy, Morocco, South Africa and Spain).
The West European market is expanding because citrus is a serai-luxury
food with income elasticity greater than unity (Evans, p. 632), but the
prospects of an individual supplier also depend on its competitive
position. Four major factors influencing competitiveness can be
identified: production costs, proximity to markets, ability to
provide the type of fruits consumers' desire and preferential trade
19
arrangements. Most producers have a favourable physical environment
(although the extent to which Israel's competitors are already having
to utilize marginal land is unclear) so the major points of difference
are wage rates, which are higher in Israel than in any of its
competitors, and technical efficiency, which is also higher in Israel.
The size of transport costs in final landed prices makes proximity to
markets an important element in competitiveness, and here Spain and
Italy are greatly favoured and Morocco and Algeria somewhat less so.
For Israel this disadvantage is partially compensated for by the high
reputation which her shamouti oranges enjoy, especially in Britain.
The quality advantage enjoyed by Israeli fruit has been the raajor
19
The following summary of the first three factors is based on Wolf.- 39 -
force in enabling her to expand her citrus exports continuously, for
even in years of reduced demand good quality citrus continue to sell
and it is the producers of inferior fruit who suffer. Despite product
differentiation, the price elasticity of Israeli citrus exports is
quite high:
"If we assume that Israeli citrus are perfect substitutes for
other exported citrus, the price elasticity facing Israel is
about six for oranges and two and one half for grapefruit.
Even if there is some segmenting of markets, the elasticity is
still quite high and in any case much greater than unity."
(Evans, p. 632).
The possibility of a high cross-price elasticity between Israeli citrus
exports and her competitors' goods places great importance on trade
preferences enjoyed by these competitors in the West European market,
since in order to compete Israeli exporters may be forced to lower
prices or to suffer a reduced rate of expansion of sales, either of
which will slow down the rate of expansion of export earnings.
During the Mandate period, Palestine's citrus exports went almost
exclusively to the United Kingdom. Since the war, however, the
relative importance of the U.K. as a citrus market has been declining
both because of her sluggish economic growth and because of an
unexplained shift in consumers' tastes there. Israel has countered
the decline of her traditional market by increasing her sales to West
Germany, the Benelux countries and Scandinavia. The French market
remained closed because France gave preferential treatment to her
North African colonies. The formation of the EEC had several con-
sequences for Israeli citrus exports to Western Europe. The common
external tariff was set at a level lower than that which France had
for her non-North African suppliers but higher than that which the
other consuming countries previously had. Thus the retail price of
Israeli fruit was increased in West Germany and the Benelux countries,
and more recently in the UK and Denmark. Furthermore Italian
producers avoided the CET, as did producers in Algeria and Morocco,
which enjoyed associate status. Israel's goal is membership of the- 40 -
EEC and at present there are plans for a Mediterranean free trade area
in conjunction with the EEC, which would improve Israel's position
relative to her competitors, but the situation still retains some
uncertainty for Israeli exporters.
Recent FAO forecasts of world trade flows in 1980 pointed to small
surpluses in oranges and grapefruit, but they appear to have been based
.20 on conservative production estimates. The increased supply is
primarily a consequence of ambitious planting in North Africa and Italy
and the entry of new Mediterranean producers into the world market.
Since Israel is a major exporter with 20 % of world trade for oranges
and 50 % for grapefruit, her export expansion plans are bound to be
affected by a potential excess supply situation. She may be able to
maintain her position because of product differentiation or may fall
back because of trade preferences to her competitors, but in either case
the situation is not one in which the proceeds from citrus exports can
be expected to increase rapidly. The only exogenous change which could
alter this picture of the medium and long term prospect would be the
opening up of the East European markets, where Israel may not suffer
tariff or distance handicaps. Even if this new market were available,
its extent is uncertain and Israel's competitors which are not faced
with diminishing marginal product of land in citrus production may take
most of the market in the absence of any consumer loyalty to "Jaffa"
fruit.
(c) Tourism
Since 1968 tourism has been Israel's greatest single earner of
foreign currency. It also has linkages which increase foreign exchange
earnings, especially via the national carriers El Al and Zim which
convey almost half of the tourists visiting Israel. Israel offers
tourists the sun and sand of the Mediterranean, historical sights and
a view of modern Israel. The latter factors ensure a large degree of
product differentiation, especially because many of the historical
sights have unique religious associations and because of the uniqueness
20
FAO Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics 21,
September 1972, p. 2.of some of the social institutions of modern Israel (e.g. kibbutzim).
Israel's comparative advantage in supplying tourist services is
modified by her high wages relative to other Mediterranean countries,
but in compensation she has a better supply of entrepreneurial
abilities.
The rapid expansion of Israel's tourist trade is revealed in
Table XVI. According to Evans' econometric model, the major factors
explaining the pattern up to 1965 were domestic conditions, i.e.
the decline in tourist earnings 1956-7 reflects the Sinai campaign
and the subsequent restriction on American tourists, and world
tourism. The principal determinants of world tourism are incomes and
population in the tourist generating countries of North America and
Western Europe (Bond and Ladman). Evans' explanatory variables do not,
however, provide an adequate explanation of the boom in Israel's
tourist trade since 1969, which has far exceeded the rate of increase
in world tourism. One factor may be the 1967 War which made the whole
of Jerusalem accessible to visitors to Israel and thus increased the
country's attractiveness for Christian and Jewish tourists. A further
factor may have been the increased expenditure on and effectiveness of
publicity. Without knowledge of the causal factors of the tourist
boom it is difficult to make projections for the future. The situation
is further complicated by the unstable political position in the
Middle East. Nevertheless, most forecasts for the 1970s are optimistic
and predict that Israel's tourist trade should continue to expand
rapidly.
Until recently few studies of tourism as an economic development
strategy existed, and now that this absence has been remedied a wide
gap has emerged between its advocates and opponents. The major
benefit of developing a tourist industry is the foreign currency it
brings into the country. It is a suitable activity for most LDCs
because they have a comparative advantage in sun vis-a-vis many of
the more developed countries and because the tourist industry is
relatively labour intensive. It is also a desirable field to enter
because world tourism is growing faster than world trade in- 42 -
Table XVI: Tourist Arrivals in Israel and Foreign Currency
























































































Source: Israel Prime Minister's Office: Israel Economic Development
(Jerusalem, 1968), p. 514, p. 517; Statistical Abstract of Israel
1973, p. Ill, p. 180; Ibid. 1969, p. 182; Ibid. 1971, p. 202.manufactures or primary products and because tourism is- income
elastic.V.V;' Proponents of tourism also point
J to favourable domestic
consequences such asvi (i) ; the stimulus jtp infrastructure,*,,!
trajisport services, and linkage "effetts 'gerierally ^: <id:)
:
r ttfie
pressure on weak-money countries to value their currencies more
realistically and . (iii) the •favourable properties of the,'!deraonstr,a-
ti<Sii effect''. Tourism has been attacked by critics as: detriment;aL to
the '-quality of life in the host country since it produces enclaves
within the; domestic economy, emphasising differences in wealth and
generating urgent aspirations which cannot be fulfilled in the ne,a.r ,
future; uln many cases thebasic assumption that.tourism-helps the ,
balance;of payments has been*questioned in the light of the predominant
position of foreign ownership of hotels, etc. The only existing cost-
benefit analysis of tourism, an analysis of the Commonwealth
Caribbean following the Little-Mirlees approach, calculated a social
rate of return close to the minimum accounting rate of interest,
although private returns were sufficient to attract investors, and it
thus concluded that government expenditure on infrastructure and
incentive schemes had been too lavish (Bryden).
The disadvantages of tourism as a leading sector in economic
development may not be fully applicable to Israel. The possibility of
tourists producing rising aspirations will be less in Israel than in
other LDCs, because incomes are higher and many Israelis have had
contact with the developed countries anyway. Also, despite the
presence of international hotel chains such as Hilton, Sheraton and
Hyatt, foreign investment does not dominate the hotel industry to the
21
An International Union of Official Travel Organisations cross-
section study across all countries found an income elasticity of
1.5 (quoted in Bryden, p. 58). Bond and Ladman's estimate for US
visitors to Latin America is close to unity.
22 •
 j AY
Estimates of the "tourist multiplier", K '..;.=' — (where AT =
the change in tourist receipts, AY = the consequential change
in national income), have ranged up to 4.3, but they have come
under heavy criticism (cf. Bryden, ch. 5).- 44 -
23 extent it does in many LDCs. The principal difference between
Israel and other LDC tourist centres is that almost half of her
incoming tourists arrive under the Israeli flag, i.e. by El Al or
Zim, which ensures thai: the linkages are substantial in terins of
foreign currency earned. The major disadvantage of tourism for Israel
is its sensitivity to (a) changes in conditions in the tourist-
generating countries, e.g. the energy crisis and the three-day week
in the UK in 1973-4, and (b) changes in Israel's security position
as perceived by potential tourists. Both of these factors are largely
outside Israeli control and can produce great instability of earnings.
Such instability can have major economic consequences, especially for
towns which have become dependent on the tourist trade (e.g. Eilat,
where 40 % of the population is engaged in occupations connected
with tourism).
The Israeli government clearly considers the possible coots to
be outweighed by the benefits from tourism. The desire to encourage
tourism is reflected in the size of the Ministry of Tourism's budget,
which was I£ 3'7m. for 1973/4 compared, to an expenditure of.I£ 7.9r.i.
in 1968/9. Generous loans are offered for the construction of new
hotels, e.g. an investor building a hotel in Eilat is entitled to a
loan covering 46 % and a grant covering 20 % of the net investment,
and foreign investors are also offered inducements in tax exemption
25
and relief on import duties. Whether such government expenditures
are economically justified or could be put to better use is an open
question, which will not be dealt with here. The fact that they exist
should ensure that tourism remains an important foreign currency
earner in the absence of any major deterioration in world tourism or
Israel's security pocition.
23
The hotel industry did, however, attract 19 % of all foreign invest-
ment in Israel in 1970 (The Israel Economist, April 1972, p. 93).
24
Statistical Abstract of Israel 1973, p. 590.
25
Article by the Minister of Tourism in The Israel Economist;, April
1972, pp." 93-4.- 45 -
The above survey of tourism in Israel is too brief to do the
subject justice. It would be desirable to evaluate government policy
more scientifically and also to study the effects of existing and
alternative policies more fully. The justification for leaving the
matter here is that tourism itself cannot be a complete strategy for
Israeli economic development. Tourism on a scale sufficient to
support her population would be intolerable in view of her small
exploitable area. Furthermore, tourism in Israel will for the
foreseeable future be at the mercy of exogenous shocks. This is not
to deny that tourism may provide a welcome and important means of
alleviating the foreign exchange constraint during the development
process, but it may be unreliable and cannot serve as a long-term
strategy in itself.
(d) Other Non-Manufactured Goods and Services
Israel's agricultural exports have always been dominated by
citrus fruit (Tables XV), despite several attempts by the government
to foster diversification. Exports of groundnuts were started in
1954, but did not expand greatly. A more substantial contribution
was made by the poultry industry after a 1957 agreement whereby the
government guaranteed minimum prices which made egg production
profitable for the producer in both domestic and foreign markets.
In 1961, however, the government reduced its support and since then
eggs have not provided a very profitable export outlet. The most
recent and longest lasting boom in non-citrus agricultural exports
started in the mid-1960s and was more firmly based on Israel's
comparative advantage. Israel's climatic conditions permit growth
of flowers, fruit and vegetables in different seasons or earlier
in a season than in western Europe, and air transport allows such
goods to be taken to the foreign markets in fresh condition. With
such goods and also some industrial crops (e.g. cotton) Israel's
skilled labour force has created efficient production conditions.
Non-citrus agricultural exports increased by 239 % between 1965
and 1972, and there is no reason why the specialized exports
developed in this period should not continue to expand in the- 46 -
future. Nevertheless, in a country of Israel's size (in terms of
arable land) even highly intensive farming has its limits as a long-
run growth strategy and even in the medium-term the contribution of
non-citrus agricultural exports to total export growth is likely to
be small in absolute terms because of the low base (cf. Table XV).
Although Israel is poor in mineral resources, there are potash
deposits in the Dead Sea area and some minor deposits of phosphates
and copper. These may be extended and can make a contribution to
26
export earnings, but such a contribution is unlikely to be large.
More significant are the earnings from transportation and other
services. Such exports are, however, difficult to predict
independently because of their derived demand nature, e.g. exports
of shipping services x*ill depend largely on the level of Israel's
trade in other goods and services.
Although the aim of my research is not to make detailed fore-
casts of Israel's future exports and imports, such forecasts do help
to cast light on the prospective relative importance of different
export sectors. Forecasts of Israel's foreign trade position in
1975 and 1980 have been made by Bruno (apparently in 1969 or 1970),
and they are presented in Table XVII, The assumptions behind Bruno's
predictions for the individual categories other than "miscellaneous
manufactures" are in line with the discussion in the present paper.
The conclusion is that the trade deficit will still remain in 1980
and the extent to which it is narrowed will depend critically on
manufactured exports:
"If we can assume that with reasonable promotion policies
exports of various invisible items will go on increasing at
rates similar to their past performance, the main burden of
supplying the gap between "required" exports and those that
could be projected under "no change" assumptions falls on
the "miscellaneous manufactures" group" (Bruno (1972), p. 132).
Exports of crude fertilizers and crude minerals were $ 5.1m. in



































































































Source: Bruno (1972), p. 118, p. 120.- 48 -
The conclusion is that any attempt to use export promotion as Israel's
major strategy for removing her trade deficit will have to be centred
on manufactured exports. For a country with few natural resources,
including a limited amount of arable land, this is an unsurprising
conclusion and it is no doubt applicable to many other small LDCs.
6. Manufactured Exports
The aim of this section is to describe and analyze the growth of
27 Israel's exports of manufactured goods other than diamonds. It has
been shown that Israel's prospects of removing her trade deficit depend
heavily on the further growth of these exports and analysis of past
performance may help assessment of the possibilities for future
increases. Manufactured export expansion has often been proposed as
a development strategy for LDCs and Israel's success in this area may
also provide "lessons" for LDCs wishing to follow such a strategy.
The basic data are given in Table XVIII, which reveals the rapid
growth of Israel's manufactured exports. Exports of the leading
industry, food processing, are also given, since the main products
(citrus-related goods) are a-typical of other manufactured exports in
that Israel is an important world supplier and Israel has a natural
advantage not possessed by other LDCs. The commodity composition of
the remaining industrial exports is examined in part (a). The
sectoral origin of Israel's manufactured exports is then examined in
part (b) and the contribution of different industries to Israel's
foreign trade account is estimated. In part (c) an aggregate
analysis of the growth of Israel's manufactured exports is undertaken
to establish the role played by their commodity composition and their
27
Throughout the present section the term "manufactured exports"
is used exclusive of direct exports from the diamond polishing
or mining sectors. In analyzing demand-side conditions (part
(c) ) food processing is also omitted, for reasons outlined in
the next paragraph, and manufactures are defined as SITC 5-8
minus 66.- 49 -















































































Source: Statistical Abstract of
Israel 1969, p. 209; Ibid. 1973,
p. 209.- 50 -
traditional markets. The aggregate analysis is then broadened to
•
introduce supply-$ide considerations and to consider the effects of
government policy towards exports. Finally, some tentative conclusions
and signposts for further research are given in part (e).
(a) The Commodity Composition of Israel's Manufactured Exports
In section 2 the expansion of Israel's exports was divided into
several sub-periods: (a) a period of rapid growth from a low base
(1949-54), (b) a period of relatively slow growth, 1954-8, (c) the
export boom of 1958-63, (d) steady growth in the mid 1960s. Such a
pattern is also reflected in the pace of expansion of manufactured
exports. This periodization is a useful device for analyzing the
commodity composition of Israel's manufactured exports because different
commodities led the way in different periods.
The early years following Israel's independence saw a rapid expan-
sion of all exports and the trade deficit reached its smallest absolute
level in 1954. In the manufacturing sector rapid expansion was
accompanied by diversification as food products fell from 58 % of manu-
factured exports other than diamonds in 1949 to 12 % in 1954 (Table
XVIII). The biggest increase occurred in motor vehicle exports, which
primarily consisted of American cars assembled in Israel and sold on
bilateral trade agreements. Next in importance were textiles and
wearing apparel, which is unsurprising since these products often
figure prominently in early industrialization and they were further-
more traditional "Jewish trades". A more interesting case is cement
exports, which increased rapidly between 1952 and 1954. Cement
production was originally intended as an import substitute but the
establishment of two domestic factories led to a capacity in excess
of domestic demand and the surplus capacity was used to produce for
export; a similar phenomenon was apparent in window glass which was
making a marginal contribution to export earnings in the mid 1950s.
The same explanation may lie behind the emergence of exports of
three other commodities which were soon to become of leading- 51 -
importance; tyres and tubes, plywood and potash and chemical
fertilizers. In all these cases there was some scope for import
substitution in the early 1950s (and government policy supplied great
incentives to utilize all opportunities for import substitution), but
the minimum optimum scale of operation was significantly below the
level of domestic demand. Thus, although import substitution policies
will generally discriminate against exporters, they can provide a
stimulus to exports in cases where the minimum optimum scale is large.
How far the provision of such a stimulus is justified for a particular
industry depends on the extent to which the incentives for import sub-
stitution reflect efficiency criterion such as domestic resource
costs. If the DRC is low then that industry should be both an
efficient import substitute producer and possess a comparative advan-
tage as an exporter. If, however, the import substitution policies
are leading to resource misallocation (i.e. not according to DRC)





The 1954-8 period saw a reduction in both the rate of growth and
the absolute increase in industrial exports (compared to 1949-54; see
Table XIX). The major features of this slowdown were:-
(1) the drastic reduction in motor vehicle exports as access to the
Finnish and Turkish markets was ended (and Israeli cars were
unable to compete on the world market),
9 Q
The process of developing export industries via an initial import
substitution phase has sometimes been advocated without specifying
the need to obey efficiency criteria. This blanket advocacy has
been satirised by Bhagwati and Chen (p. 185) as producing what one
imports and then exporting what one produces, i.e. goods which
were originally considered the least suitable for domestic
production are the ones which should be encouraged as leading
exports!- 52 -





Wearing apparel (inc. shoes)
- nylon stockings
- raincoats
- bathing suits (elastic)
Iron & steel manufactures
Plywood
Potash 4 chemical fertilizers
Cement
Prepared drugs and medicines
. Motor vehicles






















































































Note: The individual commodity groups represent all groups with



























































































































Sources: Statistical Abstract of Israel 1957/58, pp. 268-71; Ibid. 1959/f.n, pp. 279-80.- 53 -
(2) the rise and fall of iron and steel exports reflecting the
establishment of Acre steel town in the mid 1950s; this was a
case of import substitution policy not following DRC criteria
and when the excess output (over domestic demand) was offered
abroad it did not sell readily on world markets,
(3) the stagnation of textile exports, apart from woollen yarn,
(4) the large reduction in cement exports in 1959; although this was
a temporary setback, partly recouped in 1959, cement never again
attained the importance it had previously had in manufactured
exports.
At the same time exports of some commodities did expand rapidly
despite the emphasis in government policy on import substitution.
Most important of these was wearing apparel, where over half of the
increase consisted of raincoats and bathing suits. These two items
were produced largely for export (c. 85 % of output was exported)
from imported fabrics, had low capital requirements per employee,
used some skilled labour and had high value added. Their similar
attributes and seasonal sales patterns (bathing suits were exported
December-June, raincoats October-December) made them ideal complemen-
tary outputs and both products were produced by the same firms. Tyres
and tubes and plywood expanded rapidly so that both became primarily
export industries. Israel's ability to compete internationally with
these products suggests that they corresponded to her comparative
advantage at that time (both had moderate capital/labour ratios and
29
required some skilled labour). Exports of manufactured fertilizers
also increased in this period, again probably reflecting Israel's
comparative advantage, since this was one of the few products for
29
Detailed analysis of where Israel's comparative advantage lay at
different stages of her industrial development is delayed until
a later paper. At that stage it may be possible to provide tests
of some of the hypotheses advanced in the present section
regarding the performance of individual exports.which Israel was favourably endowed with raw materials. The growth
of exports of paper products, primarily cardboard, was a case of a
single modern factory being built (in line with the import substitu-
tion policy) and having capacity greater than domestic demand. A
final category of growing export commodities was books, postage
stamps, artistic handicrafts and religious articles. These all
represented specialist products with less than perfectly elastic
demand where Israel had some kind of absolute (e.g. with Jewish
religious articles) or comparative (e.g. in foreign language books)
advantage following from her people's cultural background.
The export boom of 1958-63 saw total exports grow faster than
GNP or imports (the export/import ratio passed 50 % for the first
time in 1963) and manufactured exports grew even more quickly than
total exports. The main contributors to manufactured export growth
were metal manufactures, textiles and chemicals. The sources of
export expansion were localised within these groupings (i.e. in
defence equipment, textile yarn and thread, and petrochemicals), but
an important point is that these were not the goods which had led
the export expansion of the 1954-8 period. The fourth highest
contributor to export earnings was clothing and within this sector
there was a shift away from the previous export leaders, bathing
suits and raincoats. A further feature of the export boom was the
growth of exports of machinery, iron and steel products and
electrical equipment, all of which started from a low base in 1958.
30
Commodities are grouped for 1959 and after by SITC 2 digit
classification (Table XX) and are not completely comparable with
the commodity groupings of Table XIX, which are by the Israel
Custom's tariff classification. It should be noted that the
rapid increase in SITC 59, chemicals n.e.s., between 1962 and
1963 is partly a statistical artefact reflecting the reallocation
of petrochemicals from SITC 33. This does not, however, affect
the conclusion that chemical exports grew rapidly 1958-63
because the aggregate SITC (33 +59) increased greatly.- 55 -
Table XX: MANUFACTURED EXPORTS BY C0>WODITY <* OOO)
1968 1967
51. Chenical elements and
compounds
52. Mineral tar and crude
chemicals from coal(
petroleum, etc,
53. Dyeing. tannir.£ and
colouring materials
56. Medicinal and pharma-
ceutical products









63. Wood and cork
64. Paper and products
65. Textiles
66. Non-metallic tcetals














































































































































































































































































































































































































Hote: Because of the different r.:cthcd of data presentation for 1959-60, i.e., by 1 digit SITC ard then broken
down by individual cormoditics rather than by SITC 2 ditjit classification, the niscellanec-us sections
(i.e., those endinp in 9) are inflated for these years. There are thus some reductions in t!ip values
of other commodity classifications in 1959 and 1960, but the distribution of these reductions is unknown.
Sources: Statistical Abstract of Israel 1973, pp. 202-5; Ibid. 1969, pp. 202-5; Ibid. 1967, pp. 214-7;
Ibid. 1965, pp. 246-55; Ibid. 1961~ PP. 327-9.- 56 -
Meanwhile the export growth products of 1954-8 were having
difficulties. Exports of tyres, plywood, manufactured fertilizers
and cement all fell between 1959 and 1963, as did exports of transport
equipment which had been so important in the early 1950s. Exports of
paper and its products rose, but only marginally. The explanation of
such a thorough change in Israel's export bundle probably lies in both
demand and supply conditions. The 1954-8 export goods required a
relatively low degree of sophistication and when other LDCs attempted
to expand their manufactured exports in the 1960s these were the type
of goods they tried to produce. Thus Israel not only experienced
greater difficulty in selling in the LDCs, where domestic producers
now existed, but in all markets. A further demand side problem was
that some of the products, plywood in particular, were being produced
with the UK market in mind and this market was sluggish in the early
31 1960s. On the supply side the relative opportunity costs of Israel's
factors of production changed after the achievement of full employment
of labour in 1960. The new export goods all had higher capital-
labour ratios than the 1954-8 export leaders (Ben-Bassat and Bregman,
p. 33). Thus it appears that the change in the composition of
Israel's manufactured exports reflected a change in her comparative
advantage.
Manufactured exports continued to grow steadily after 1963, but
not so rapidly as 1958-63. There were further changes in the ranking
of commodities by contribution to export earnings between 1963 and
1968, but not as dramatic as in the previous period (Table XXI);
clothing moved to the top of the list, while textiles fell to fifth
place. A newly important export group was transport equipment; this
was not due to a revival of the export of assembled cars, but to the
establishment of ships and aircraft as exports. There was a
resurgence in the export of manufactured fertilizers, but exports of
tyres, plywood and cement grew very slowly, while exports of paper
and its products fell.
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years of the time period and summations are over all manufactured goods except diamonds and food products,
Source: Tables XIX and XX.- 58 -
The pattern which can be identified, albeit at an incipient
stage, in manufactured exports between 1963 and 1968 is a movement
32 towards more skill-intensive goods. Major examples of this were
the shift from textiles to clothing and the growth of aircraft exports,
but many minor examples could also be found (Bruno (1972), pp. 130-2).
This trend was continued and slightly accelerated after 1968. Most
dramatically, electrical equipment jumped from being the thirteenth
most important category in Table XX to the fifth. Exports of trans-
port equipment did not increase as rapidly as 1963-8, but this masks
33 a large increase in aircraft exports (offset by reduced growth of
exports of ships, etc.). Especially to be noted is the emergence of
new, but rapidly growing, export sectors with a high skill content,
e.g. professional and scientific instruments and medical and
pharmaceutical products, and with a moderate skill content, e.g.
furniture. Exports of manufactured fertilizers continued to grow
rapidly, reflecting increased exploitation of the Dead Sea potash
desposits. Exports of paper and products grew slowly and exports of
plywood fell, leading to talk of discontinuing exports as dcjiastic
demand exceeded production capacity. A curio was the revival of
exports of tyres and tubes, which had stagnated for most of the
1960s, but which doubled between 1967 and 1971.
The changing pattern of the leaders of manufactured export
growth is summarized in Table XXI. It has been suggested during the
discussion of these changes in the commodity composition that they
32
The same movement is found by Hirsch in microeconomic study based
on a sample of 190 Israeli exporters (Hirsch, 1970).
33
The accounts of the state-owned Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd.
are kept secret but a report by the LAI President in Autumn 1973
revealed an increase in exports from $ 6.5m. in 1968 to an
estimated $ 43m. (reported in Time (European Edition), 19
August, 1974, pp. 74-5).
34
Bank of Israel Annual Report 1972, pp. 275-6.- 59 -
reflect adjustments to a changing pattern of comparative advantage.
This hypothesis will not be tested here (cf. fn. 29). The hypothesis
that the commodity composition of Israel's manufactured exports
affected their growth potential will be tested below (section (c)\,
To close the present section we will examine the question of how, if
Israeli producers were so flexible in shifting between different
export goods, could the commodity composition of her exports be
sufficiently fixed at any point in time to be a positive or negative
factor for future growth.
The key to answering this question is the fact that, although
the leading export growth commodities changed over time, Israel's
exports have always been concentrated in a few commodities and,
although the ranking of these goods changed, the total bundle did not
alter greatly. In every year since 1956 the eight leading manufactured
exports (by 3 digit SITC classification) have accounted for over half
of Israel's commodity exports other than diamonds and fresh citrus.
Furthermore, this group of leading export goods consisted of the
same eight commodities in every year between 1954 and 1969 except
for the momentary appearance of ships and boats (SITC 735) in 1967
and refined petroleum products (SITC 599) in 1966-9. The eight
leaders were canned and processed fruit (053), clothing (841), yarn
and woven textiles (65!), rubber products (629), metal products (698),
35 manufactured fertilizers (561), plywood (631) and cement (661).
The conclusion from the previous paragraph is that Israel's
manufactured exports are highly concentrated by commodity. This may
explain the rapid growth of these exports if the concentration lay
in commodities with expanding world markets. On the other hand,
35
The products are ordered by their average rank 1954-69. The
source is Amiel (1973), p. 54. Rankings for selected years are
given in Table XXII.- 60 -
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Note: commodities are identified by SITC 3 digit code, SITC 053 =
canned and processed fruit, 561 = manufactured fertilizers,
599 = refined petroleum products, 629 = rubber products,
631 = plywood, 651 = yarn and woven textiles, 661 = cement,
698 = metal products, 735 = ships and boats, 841 = clothing.
Source: Amiel (1973), p. 54.- 61 -
continued reliance on export goods whose adoption was related tc
Israel's comparative advantage at an early stage of her development
may be a brake on current export growth if Israel is no longer
competitive in these goods and if their world markets are SIOTJ-
growing. These questions can be tackled by the constant market
shares method and the data of this section will be used for such an
analysis in part (c). Before turning to this analysis we will look
at an alternative dimension of Israel's manufactured exports, their
sectoral origin.
(b) The Sectoral Origin of Israel's Exports
Although commodity composition is the most usual criterion for
disaggregating a country's exports, it is not always the most relevant.
With respect to marketing questions (such as the prospects in world
markets for Israel's existing exports or the demand-side effects of
concentration on a small number of export goods) disaggregation by
commodities is logical, but with respect to supply side questions
(such as the optimal policies for removing supply side bottlenecks or
encouraging export production) disaggregation by sectoral origin is
preferable. This is especially true in view of the fact that supply
side problems of bottlenecks and backward linkages are best analysed
in an input-output framework and 1-0 tables appear with an induetry
classification.
Israel's exports by sectoral origin in 1958 and 1968 are given
in the first columns of Tables XXIII and XXIV. The distribution of
exports by sectoral origin differs little from the commodity
distribution. The raw export figures can, however, only provide an
incomplete guide to an industry's contribution to Israel's balance
of payments. The significance of industries with large import require-
ments is overstated. Thus in column 2 of Tables XXIII and XXIV the.
direct import component of exports (m. . e.) is given. A more
complete measure of industries' import requirements is given in
column 3 which states total (direct plus indirect) requirements- 62 -
Table XXIII: DIRECT EXPORTS, IMPORT COMPONENT OF EXPORTS AND TOTAL (DIRECT AND INDIRECT) EXPORTS BY







7. Textile and apparel
8. Wood and carpentry
9. Paper, printing and
publishing
10. Leather and leather
products
II. Rubber and plastic
products
12. Chemicals, oil and soap
13. Oil refineries




18. Machinery and vehicles




23. Shipping and aviation
24. Other communication



















































































































































Source: Bruno 1962,pp. 36-7, p. 93, pp. 94-5.- 63 -
Table XXIV: DIRECT EXPORTS, WfPORT COMPONENT OF EXPORTS AND TOTAL (DIRECT AND INDIRECT) EXPORTS BY





5. Mining and quarrying
6. Food
7. Textiles and clothing
8, Wood and carpentry
9. Paper, printing and
publishing
10. Leather and products


















26. Road passenger transport
















































































































































































Source: Chen p. 29, pp. 30-3, pp. 46-9, pp. 50-3; Statistical Abstract of Israel 1973, p. 209.(m. . e.). Thus, the rv.2t foreign exchange earnings by Israeli
producers of goods ?.nd services is equal to column 1 minus column 3_,
i.e. Z e. - E m. = e.>. . l . i .
:-
l. i
Total exports surras direct and indirect import requirements is
usually considared the optiEum tneasuro of the- contribution of
different sectors to the trade balance, but a better measure would be
one that included output which goes indirectly as well as directly to
36
exports. Thus, the citrus industry contributes to Israeli exports
not only by its direct nalss abroad but also by its provision of inputs
for the food processing industry. If the value-added by the food-
processing industry were small then, it would be undesirable that all
of the foreign exchange ecraings from its products should be ascribed
to that industry sue none to the citrus branch which is responsible
for a largo proportion of the food-processing industry's gross output.
The solution to this kind of anomaly is to reallocate export earnings
from a gross output to a valus-added basis. If this is done properly,
the total of all sectors' contributions to foreign exchange earnings
will be unchanged but the relative importance of sectors may differ.
The vector of "redefined exports" as described in the previous
37 paragraph • is derived, in matrix algebra terns, by:
(3) E* = V . (I-/O~- . S
where E is the (n x i) vector of redefined exports for the n sectors
of the economy. The r-iatri:: V is ;i diagonal matrix whose diagonal
This point was originally made in a slightly different context by
Bluncnthal. The concapt has been applied to a balance of payments
analysis for Yugoslavia by Chittle, who stresses the ar.yrnnetrical
treatment of imports (direct plus indirect) and experts (c.irect
only) in the conventional rsssure.
37
Our "redefined exports" -.r.ust not: ba confuted with the concept employed
by_ Tyler in a,different context (T^'ler (1973a), p. 35), Eic mccsure
E™ ~ (I-A) ' . E is greater than our E" because (a) lie user, an 1-0
table which includes import :-aqu:L~er^£r:tr> and (b) he does n.ot reduce
his redefined exports by t:ic V rnatri::. The Tyler measure wcild b^
..... continved on next page- 65 -
elements, v.., are equal to the proportion of value-added in gross
output of sector i and all other elements are zero. The (I-A )
matrix is the Leontief inverse of an 1-0 table of domestic require-
ments. Each element v. . s.. of the i row of V (I-A ) is the
value-added in industry i required to produce one unit of final product
of j. Thus the value-added from industry i in total exports (et)
is given by:
n




which is equivalent to equation (1). Estimates of e* for Israel in
oo
 1
1958 and 1968 are given in Tables XXIII and XXIV.
The redefined exports, e. , are conceptually the ideal measure
of the contribution of the various sectors of the economy to net
export earnings. In practice, however, the measure is difficult to
estimate because it is only strictly feasible in years for which 1-0
tables exist. Thus, it may be asked whether this redefining of
exports makes substantial alterations to the raw export data in
column 1 of Tables XXIII and XXIV. The manufacturing sectors (other
than mining and diamonds) were ranked by e. and e. and the Spearman
1
1 .39
rank correlation coefficient was calculated for these two rankings.
In 1958 R = 0.87 and in 1968 R = 0.71, both of which indicate
s s '
no significant difference between the two rankings.
Footnote continued from p. 64.
inappropriate for our purposes because (a) in assessing the contri-
bution of domestic sectors to export earnings use of imports of
similar goods is clearly not to be attributed to that sector and
(b) redefining exports on a gross output basis leads to double
counting of the sources of actual foreign exchange earned.
38
The dates were determined by the availability of 1-0 tables for
the Israeli economy, but they are also satisfactory for our
purposes in that 1958 represents the start of the export boom and
1968 a fairly recent reference year.
39
The sectors used were 6-14 and 16-18 inclusive in 1958 and 6-14
and 16-21 inclusive in 1968. The critical values of R are 0.71
for 1958 and 0.63 for 1968.
 S- 66 -
The negative results of statistical tests of the difference
between the two estimates of sectoral contributions to export earnings
does not tell the whole story. Although the differences are
statistically insignificant, they are not random. In particular e.
understates the importance of the contribution of infrastructure
branches such as electricity, water and internal communications.
Within manufacturing, e. understates the importance of the machinery
and paper products sectors, both of which produce intermediate goods
used in the production of final export goods, while the importance of
the consumer goods industries (especially food processing with its
low value-added) is overstated. Furthermore, the deviation of e.
from e. increases over time, implying that the simple measure becomes
less appropriate as the economy becomes more developed. Failure to
use the redefined concept of exports will mask the extent of the
increasing importance over time of the producer goods sector as a
contributor to foreign exchange earning. Because of the biases
imparted by use of e., the measure e. will be used wherever feasible.
The relative importance of the contributions of the different
manufacturing sectors to export earnings is summarized in Table XXV.
In the light of the discussion in the previous section of the
commodity composition of Israel's exports the data in Table XXV are
unsurprising. Textiles and clothing was the most important branch
in both 1958 and 1968, and the broad category "machinery and vehicles"
was second in both years. The major trend among other branches was
the declining relative importance of the sectors producing the big
manufactured exports of the 1950s, i.e. tyres, plywood and cement.
The sectors which increased in importance were metal products, basic
metals, chemicals and the food processing industry.
The purpose of this section has been to identify the sectoral
origin of Israel's exports. In order to do this new estimates of the
sectoral contribution to total exports are made. Although the final
results could have been guessed from knowledge of the conrmodifcy- 67 -
Table XXV: MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES RANKED BY CONTRIBUTION TO
FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS 1958 and 1968
Textiles and clothing
Machinery and vehicles
Rubber and plastic products
Wood and carpentry
Chemicals
Paper, printing and publishing
Food
Glass, ceramics and cement
Metal products
Leather and leather products
Basic metals
Oil refineries



























composition of her exports, the separate exercise is considered worth-
while because it provides further data for analysing the supply si.de
of manufactured exports. This is especially significant in that
commodity composition breakdowns of exports and also the usual
sectoral origin breakdowns overstate the importance of consumer goods
industries vis-a-vis producer goods industries. This bias becomes
more significant as a country becomes more economically developed and
its industries more interdependent, in which case the role of
industries providing inputs to the final export industries becomes
increasingly critical; the producers of the intermediate inputs can
help exports if by increasing efficiency they reduce their outrut
prices or they can become the source of inelastic export supply if- 68 -
40
they cause bottlenecks of crucial inputs. For this reason the new
estimates are considered superior for analysing supply side questions
regarding exports and will be used in that context in section 6 (e)
and in future research.
(c) Constant Market Shares Analysis of Israel's Manufactured Exports
Having described the commodity composition of Israel's manu-
factured exports and their sectoral origin, we will now attempt to
identify the major factors responsible for their rapid aggregate
growth. As a first step the importance of various demand side factors
will be estimated by the constant market share method. Since CMS
analysis has already been used in section 4 its mechanics and its
limitations will not be repeated here. The CMS method provides an
ex post division of the actual growth of manufactured exports into
four parts: the world trade, commodity, market and "competitiveness"
effects. The first three are demand side phenomena reflecting how
far Israel's manufactured exports have grown apace with world trade
in manufactured goods and how far deviations from the constant share
are associated with concentration of exports in commodities or to
markets with above or below average growth rates. The fourth part
of the CMS division is a residual representing the difference between
the actual increase in Israeli exports and what the increase would
40
There is an interesting parallel here to the development of
economists' thoughts on import substitution. In most countries
early ISI was in consumer goods industries, since the LDCs could
best compete with imports in these lines. It soon became clear,
however, that such ISI was increasing requirements for imported
inputs and that a thorough-going ISI strategy required invest-
ment in producer goods industries. The difficulty for ISI
practising LDCs to carry out such a strategy success.fully was
one reason for the shift in economists' prescriptions towards
exports, which was also a return in emphasis to consumer goods
production. The present section shows, however, that opportunities
for promotion of manufactured exports based solely on expansion
of the consumer goods industries may be limited and as the
economy develops diversification into producer goods may play
just as integral a role in an export promotion strategy as in
an ISI strategy.- 69 -
have been if Israel had maintained a constant share in the market for
each commodity at each destination. This increased "competitiveness"
may be due to supply-side factors (i.e. increased efficiency in
production and/or marketing) or to government policy (e.g. increasing
private returns to exporters or reducing risk).
The CMS estimates of the sources of change in Israeli manu-
factured exports during the 1960s are given in Table XXVI. As in
section 4, two alternative estimates exist depending on whether the
commodity or the market effect is calculated first. Under both
estimates the commodity effect is slightly more harmful than in
Israel's exports as a whole, which suggests that the concentration of
Israel's merchandise exports in citrus and diamonds has been bene-
ficial. In contrast, the market distribution effect is slightly more
favourable in manufactured exports than in total exports. This is
probably a reflection of the fact that the difference between the
import growth rate in the European and North American countries and
the import growth rate in the rest of the world was larger for manu-
factured goods than for total commodity imports in the 1960s. Israel
has well established trading links with the USA and Europe.
Although there is a small difference in the relative importance
of the commodity and market distribution effects, the conclusions
arrived at in examining the change in Israel's total exports in the
1960s appear true of Israel's manufactured exports too. The growth
of world demand for manufactured goods accounted for 58 % of the
change in Israel's manufactured exports (exactly the same percentage
as for total exports) and was the most important single factor.
Changes in the commodity and market composition of xrorld demand,
however, accounted for a mere one or two per cent of the increase in
Israel's manufactured exports. The remaining 40 % of the increase
is accounted for by improved "competitiveness".
The CMS estimates for Israel can be compared to similar estimates
of the sources of manufactured export growth for some other countriesTable XXVI: THE SOURCES OF CHANGES IN ISRAEL'S EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED GOODS, 1960-1969
Manufactured exports in 1960
Manufactured exports in 1969
Increase in manufactured exports
Increase due to:
increase in world trade
commodity effect

































Note: Calculations based on seven markets (North America, EEC, EFTA, Comecon, Other Europe, Asia
and Africa and the Rest of the World) and three commodity groups (SITC 5, 7 and 6+8-66).
Percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding.
o
I
Sources: UN Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1972,
UN Commodity Trade Statistics 1961, 1969.- 71 -
(cf. Table XXVIJ). India's adverse commodity effect is almost entirely
due to the size of her textile industry in the base year and a CMS
analysis applied to manufactured goods other than textiles reduced
the size-of the commodity effect to -A % (Banerji (1973), p. 99).
Otherwise the commodity and market distribution effects do not differ
very much in magnitude between Egypt, India, Spain and Israel. The
world trade effect is, however, significantly smaller and the "competi-
tiveness" effect significantly greater for the more successful
exporters of manufactured goods, Israel and Spain, than for India or
Egypt (except for Egypt's 1960-5 "competitiveness" effect). The small
world trade effect is a statistical consequence of success, i.e.
the higher the actual growth in exports is the lower the world trade
effect will be. The high "competitiveness" effects suggests that
the reasons behind success in exporting manufactures are domestic
(supply-side) factors or government policy.
Table XXVII; ESTIMATES OF SOURCES OF MANUFACTURED EXPORT GROWTH




















p. 98; Donges (1972) ,
Egypt
1960-5 1965-70
73 % 92 %
-9 % -20 %
-26 % -8 %
62 % 26 %
p. 207; Girgis, p.136,
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The actual growth in exports (G) is equal to the change in exporte
divided by base year exports. The world trade effect is cher^fore
equal to r/G, where r is the growth rate of world trade.- 72 -
Although the CMS analysis stresses the significance of the increase
in world demand for manufactured goods in explaining the rapid growth
of Israeli manufactured exports, it also emphasises the lack of
importance of exogenous changes in the composition of that demand
which might have been specifically beneficial to Israel. Almost three
fifths of the expansion of these exports in the 1960s was accounted for
by her keeping pace with the growth of world trade in manufactured
goods. The remainder of the expansion was accounted for by her
increasing her share of individual commodity and geographic markets.
Since most LDCs have not even been able to retain their own share of
world manufactured trade Israel's performance requires further analysis.
The CMS analysis indicates that the first priority is to identify
some of the separate factors which make up the "competitiveness"
effect. Thus, in the next section we adopt a broader approach to
analysing manufactured export performance, which will include supply-
side factors and government policy as well as demand conditions.
(d) Israel's Supply Function for Manufactured Exports
Although the supply of manufactured exports is affected by many
factors, it may be possible to abstract from these and concentrate on
a small number of independent variables which explain a large part of
the functional relationship. The procedure in this section will thus
be to start from simple specifications of export supply behaviour and
then build up more complete specifications.












where R is the real exchange rate for manufactured exports and ^ and
Xo are the quantity demanded and quantity supplied of manufactured- 73 -
exports. This model is unsatisfactory for estimation purposes since
(5a) and (5b) are underidentified. Even if the coefficient in (5a)
were constrained by an assumption of perfectly elastic foreign
demand, the supply equation would remain underidentified.
The rate of capacity utilization has been suggested as an
explanatory variable in the supply equation and in previous studies
of Spanish and Brazilian manufactured exports has been found important
(Donges (1972), p. 203; Tyler (1973b)). The argument is that domestic
sales are more profitable than exports and thus at times of high
domestic demand firms will operate at full capacity and will export
little. Conversely, during domestic recessions capacity utilization
will be low and firms will attempt to export as much as possible.
After inclusion of the rate of capacity utilization (U) in the modal,
a sufficient condition for solution of the identification problem is
that foreign demand is perfectly elastic, which is a reasonable
assumption for a country supplying a small proportion of total manu-
factured exports. The supply function for Israeli manufactured
exports was estimated for 1952-71 as:-
(6) £n X = -9.27 + 2.89 In R + 0.09 £n U R
2 = O.79&
(1.92) (0.36)
 t (0.14) DW m QA0
The coefficient for R is significant and has the expected sign, but
otherwise the estimated equation is not very satisfactory. The
coefficient for U is not significant (and the sign is not as
expected) and the Durbin-Watson of statistic indicates significant
42
serial correlation.
The data used in (6) and all other regression equations in this
section are given in the Appendix. The bracketed figures arc the
standard errors of the coefficients. Other specifications of the
functional form were tried for the various equations and were
rejected as less satisfactory than the double logarithmic form.
In an attempt to deal with the ubiquitous serial correlation
first differences of the variables were taken for this and other
equations, but in all cases the R fell drastically and sorna of
the coefficients exhibited wrong signs and/or became stf.ti3tice.lly
.... continued on next page- 74 -
A major reason for the deficiencies of (6) is that the model on
which it is based is essentially short-term, which conflicts with the
necessity of acquiring maximum degrees of freedom from the available
annual data. Since during this period Israel was undergoing
continuous industrial growth accompanied by increased productivity,
a rightward shift in her aggregate supply curve took place. This
implies lower unit costs for manufactured exports and greater
competitiveness. The continuous shift in the aggregate supply curve
can be captured by introducing a measure of industrial production (P)
into (6). The relationship is:-






2 = 0.916 DW = 1.51
Equation (7) represents a statistically better relationship than (&)
Lfic
43
2 because all coefficients are significant, R is higher and significant
serial correlation does not exist.
The findings of equation (7) conform to our a priori expectations,
Israeli producers of manufactured goods were responsive to charges
in relative prices (in export markets vis-a-vis domestic markets) and
Footnote continued from p. 73.
insignificant. Inclusion of a trend term in the dependent variable
(Tr ) in (6) raised the d-statistic into the zone where it no
X
longer indicates significant serial correlation:






2 = .937 DW = 1.66
The coefficients for both independent variables now have the
expected sign and the R has been increased, but the economic
justification for including Tr as an independent variable is unclear.
X
The d-statistic is, however, not very satisfactory here, since x<dth
20 observations and 3 independent variables there exists a wide band
(0.90 < d < 1.83 for a one tail test at the 5 % level) within which
the test is indecisive. The von Neumann statistic, which possesses
precise significance points (Theil and Nagar), indicates significant
serial correlation in (7) at the 5 % level, but not at the 1 %
level. It should be recalled that the existence of serial
correlation does not necessarily bias the OLS estimates, but it does
invalidate the usual tests of significance of the coefficients.- 75 -
this price elasticity of supply meant that the government's financial
inducements to exporters had a positive effect on the value cf exports.
This result corroborates the descriptive account of Israel's export
policies and performance given in sections 1 and 2 (cf. also p. 25
above). The strong upward trend of both manufactured output and manu-
factured exports in Israel makes the positive correlation between X
and P unsurprising. The importance of the recession-boom effect,
which was suggested in the descriptive account of Israel's experts
(p. 20 above), is confirmed by (7).
A further supply-side determinant of manufactured exports may have
been government policy towards producers of such goods, e.g. invest-
ment allocations and indirect promotional assistance. These factors
are, however, not easy to quantify. Their omission from the present
analysis can be justified to some extent by the fact that the intensity
of these forms of export promotion was closely correlated with move-
ments in the effective exchange rate and thus P. may be considered a
44
proxy for all government policies towards exports.
As a final step in our use of regression analysis to quantify the
determinants of manufactured exports we will use an "aggregated
industrial export function" (Tyler (1973b), cf. also Donges (1972)).
This function, slightly modified to Israeli conditions, is:-
(8)
where W = world trade in manufactured goods. This is neither a demand
nor a supply function; it is rather a catchall function including
quantifiable elements of both demand and supply. Thus there is a fc:.as
against non-quantifiable factors and also the function's theoretical
44
In the light of section 6 (b) government policy which indirectly
affects manufactured exports (e.g. the provision of infrastructure)
may also be important, but it is difficult to quantify.- 76 -
justification is rather unclear. Nevertheless, it has been justified
on the grounds that it may shed some light as to which explanatory
variables should be examined in greater detail by other methods.
The relationship obtained when (6) was applied to Israeli manu-
factured exports 1952-71 is:-
(9) £n X = -7.52 + 1.05 £n R -0.36 In U + 2.63 in P
(1.43) (.33) (0.10)
 Z (0.59)
-2.12 In W R
2 .951
(0.64) DW = 1.18
The d-statistic is indecisive and all coefficients are significant at
the 5 % level. For R, U and P equation (9) repeats the findings of
(7). The negative coefficient for world manufactured exports, which
is against all expectations, is a cause for concern. The reason for
the "wrong" sign is that the specification of (8) makes multicolline-
arity probable, in particular between P and W which both exhibited an
exponential growth trend. In the presence of multicollinearity OLS
is unable to provide satisfactory estimates of the coefficients of the
intercorrelated variables, and thus the estimated coefficients of both
46 P and W are dubious.
For purposes of analysing Israeli manufactured exports (7) is
superior to (9) because of the smaller incidence of multicollinearity.
For comparative purposes, however, (9) has some value in that similar
specifications have been used to analyse the performance of two other
semi-industrialized countries which have been successful exporters of
manufactured goods. Donges' regression equation for Spain, using
45
The von Neumann statistic indicates significant serial correlation.
46
The existence of multicollinearity between P and W is the reason
why the coefficients for R and U are not much affected by the
introduction of W, but that of P is greatly altered.- 77 -
annual data for 1951-69, was (Donges (1972), ?. 202):-










t DW = 2.01
This differs slightly from (9) in that W is world income, G is govern-
ment export policy and Tr has been introduced to reduce serial
correlation (although it may be expected that it has exacerbated the
problem of multicollinearity). For Brazil, Tyler fitted the following
regression equation using quarterly data for 1961-8 (Tyler (1973b),
p. 12):-
(11) X = -99082.4 + 94629.7 R + 90.25 G -878.0 U + 797.5 P
t (30503.5) (39202.7) (189.8) (413.9)
 t (440.3)
 t
+ 0.060 W R
2 = 0.86
(153) DW = 1.29
In the Spanish case the statistically significant explanatory variables
are world demand and the trend in Spanish manufactured exports, which
implies that Spanish manufactured exports have grown primarily in
response to demand side stimuli. Policy measures have worked in the
desired direction and domestic supply conditions (in the form of the
recession/boom effect) have had some influence, but .both these factors
appear relatively weak. In Brazil, in contrast, the world trade
variable was not significant. The only statistically significant
explanatory variables were the real exchange rate and the utilization
variable. Industrial production was positively related to manu-
factured exports but the coefficient was not statistically significant.
The conclusion from comparison of the results for Spain, Brazil, and
Israel is that government policy, especially the real exchange rate,
played a positive role in stimulating manufactured exports in all- 78 -
three countries. The recession/boom effect was apparent in all three
countries. Other supply-side forces were x^eaker in Spain and Brazil
than in Israel. It must be borne in mind, however, that the
regression equations on which these conclusions are based are far
from perfect since they all suffer from lack of degrees of freedom
and the problems of multicollinearity and serial correlation.
Despite the weaknesses of the econometric analysis in this
section, it does throw some light on the growth of Israel's manu-
factured exports. Government policy, as reflected in the real effec-
tive exchange rate, i?as an important explanatory variable. In the
short-term manufactured export performance was related to the
recession/boom effect. Although this conclusion is consistent with
studies of Spain and Brazil it is slightly surprising for Israel,
in that the recession/boom effect is often thought to reflect a lack
of export orientation and is thus expected only in countries whose
entrepreneurs have no tradition of exporting or have only recently
turned to export markets. The. other significant relationship
found in the regression analysis was betx^een manufactured exports
and industrial production. The analysis itself provides no guide as
to causality and economic theory too is ambivalent. On the one hand
there is a body of thought which sees exports as a possible engine
for industrial growth via increased demand, while on the other hand
industrial groxvrth raay itself improve competitive efficiency in export
markets. The large "competitiveness effect" found in section 6 (c)
and the insignificant coefficient for the world trade variable in
equation (9) are small pointers in favour of the latter view, but the
aggregate analysis carried out co far permits no firm conclusion.
In the absence of the variable ? in equation (10) this conclusion
is even more tentative than the others.
For empirical evidence of the weakness of the recession/boom
effect in an export-oriented developed economy cf. Blumenthal's
study of postwar Japan (Blumsnthal, pp. 628-30).- 79 -
(e) Conclusions
The growth of Israel's manufactured exports other than diamonds
has been described in this ection. The composition of these exports
has changed over time in a manner which suggests a response to
changing patterns of comparative advantage. Despite these shifts in
composition Israel's manufactured exports have always been con-
centrated in a small number of commodities - eight goods accounting
for around half of the total manufactured exports excluding diamonds
(Table XXII) - and despite changes in their ranking the eight
leaders have remained fairly constant. Commodity concentration has,
however, had little (demand-side) effect on the rate of growth of
Israel's manufactured exports. The markets for these goods also
tended to be concentrated - in North America and Western Europe -
and this had a slight beneficial effect on their growth rate. In the
absence of any major shifts in world demand for Israel's exports
(vis-a-vis world demand for all manufactured exports) or in the
growth rate of import demand in Israel's export markets (vis-a-vis
the growth of world demand), we turned to the supply-side for an
explanation of the high rate of growth of Israel's manufactured
exports, in which she not only kept pace with the increase in world
demand but also increased her market shares. Policy variables were
found to be important. The recession/boom effect was significant,
although we expect this to decline (or perhaps already to have
declined) in importance as firms become more export oriented. We
also found a strong positive relationship between manufactured exports
and industrial production, but the direction of causality is uncertain.
Comparison of the growth of exports and the increase in the
gross output of individual industrial sectors casts further light on
the export/production relationship. The increase in total exports
(direct and indirect) and gross output of eleven industrial sectors
is given in Table XXVIII. The Spearman rank correlation


































































Source: Tables XXII and XXIII; Bruno (1962), p. 37; Chen, p. 29.- 81 -
49 significant beyond the 1 % level. Belief in a strong positive
relationship between growth in manufactured exports and industrial
production is reinforced, but the question of causality remains
unresolved. It is difficult to see how this relationship can be
analysed further at the aggregate level, and the direction for future
research will be to examine more closely its applicability in
different industrial branches.
Finally, it must be emphasised that the conclusions of the paper
and the declared intention of turning to more disaggregated analysis
in order to uncover the causal relationships underlying the growth of
Israel's manufactured exports are not aimed at proving the existence
of a single cause of this growth. The explanation of manufactured
export growth may differ between products and over time. In the
present paper at least three possible theories have been put forward.
Firstly, in analysing the successful manufactured exports of the 1950s,
it was suggested that many of these were unintended (by the Israeli
government) consequences of import substitution policies, arising
from the technical conditions of factory production of those goods and
the small size of the domestic market. Secondly, it was found that the
commodity composition of Israel's manufactured exports appeared to
shift in response to changes in comparative advantage. The corollary
of this is that measures which facilitate improved domestic resource
allocation, permitting greater responsiveness to changing factor and
49
Use of a non-parametric test such as the rank correlation coefficient
avoids some problems of regression analysis, e.g. there is (i) no
assumption of linearity in the relationship between dependent and
independent variable, (ii) no problem of heteroscedasticity. The
price paid for this is that R only uses the ordinal properties of
the data and thus sacrifices some information. Regression
equations fitted to the data in Table XXVII yielded significant
positive coefficients (using both linear and double-logarithmic
specifications) but the R values were low. The main argument
against using these results is the dubious applicability of OLS
methods with so few degrees of freedom.- 82 -
product prices, may improve export performance. Finally, increases
in industrial output, which were perhaps initiated by export
opportunities, may have increased Israel's international competitive-
ness by reducing unit costs. The implications of this abundance of
theories are that the lessons to be drawn from the past growth of
Israel's manufactured exports cannot be applied indiscriminately to
analysis of the future growth of these exports or to other LDC's
prospects of increasing their manufactured exports. On the other
hand, if care is taken in respecting conditions such as the stage
of economic development and the structure of industrial production,
the Israeli experience can illuminate the process of increasing manu-
factured exports.
Thus, the import liberalization policy of the 1960s may well
have had a beneficial effect on Israeli manufactured exports.- 83 -
APPENDIX
The data used in the regression analyses of section 6 (d) are
given in Table Al. The sources of the various data are described in
the accompanying text.
The observations for X, manufactured exports excluding diamonds
and products of the mining sector, are from Table XVIII. The values
of Tr are derived from a semi-logarithmic trend fitted to the time
series of X.
The variable R is equal to the effective exchange rrata for
manufactured exports (for 1952-62 it is for merchandise exports
excluding citrus and diamonds (Michaely (1971), p. 102) and for
1961-71 it is for exports of industrial products (Amiel (1972), p. 32)
deflated by an index of relative prices in Israel and in her export
markets. It is given in Table Al in index form with 1954 = 100.
Finding a suitable Israeli price index posed a major problem, which
was resolved by splicing three different indexes which are
increasingly inappropriate as they go back in time. For 1963-71 the
CBS wholesale price index of industrial output (Statistical Abstract
of Israel 1973, p. 255; Ibid. 1968, p. 239), for 1959-63 the CBS
consumer price index for industrial products (Ibid. 1968, p. 234;
Ibid. 1964, p. 234) and for 1952-59 Michaely's GNP pries deflator
(Michaely (1971), p. 94) were used. The index of prices in Israel's
export markets is a weighted average of the consumer price indices
in her four major markets (USA, UK, West Germany and Japan), adjusted
for exchange rate changes in the pound, mark and yen against the
dollar (source: UN Statistical Yearbook, 1958, 1963, 1967, and UN
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, November 1974). The four indices
were weighted by the countries' shares in world trade.
A consistent series on NDP (in I £m.) in manufacturing industry






















































































































































Central Bureau of Statistics: National Income and Expenditure
1950-1968 (Jerusalem, 1970), pp. 110-1. This was extended to 1971
with data from various Statistical Abstracts of Israel (SAI 1971,
p. 372; SAI 1972, p. 167; SAI 1973, p. 169, 435). The complete
series on industrial production was put into constant (1964) prices
using the price indexes described in the previous paragraph.
The recession/boom effect was measured by deviations from the






Since the deviations (P - P ) contained negative values they were
put in index form by adding a constant. Thus U = (P - P + 250).
This is the same procedure follox<red by Tyler (Tyler 1973b) and has a
close affinity to the Wharton method of estimating capacity utiliz-
ation. For this reason U is often referred to in the text as
"'utilization", although it is readily conceded that it is an imperfect
measure of capacity utilization.
Data on world trade in manufactured goods (in billions of US
dollars) were obtained for 1952-70 in the UN Handbook of International
Trade and Development Statistics 1972, p. 43. For 1971 world trade
in SITC categories 5-8 was taken from UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
July 1973, pp. xxx-xxxiv.- 86 -
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